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The Evolution of COMECON 
In January 1964 the Council of Mutual Economic Assist-
ance1 celebrated its fifteenth anniversary. Despite the fact that 
fifteen years is a fairly long time in the life of any international 
organization, the anniversary passed without creating much 
excitement. It is not very surprising that the acronym COME-
CON is familiar to only a small group of people. For roughly 
the first ten years of its existence COMECON appeared largely 
dormant, and it was not until the late 1950s that it began to 
show signs of life. 2 
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to trace broadly 
the development of COMECON from its origin,3 and second, 
to sketch its current institutional framework and policies. 
The study will also include some speculations about the or-
ganization's future. An attempt will be made to look at 
COMECON from both the political and economic points of 
view in the belief that the tenuous borderline between politics 
and economics becomes nearly obliterated in the case of com-
munist countries. Coordination of economic plans, interna-
1 Hereafter referred to as COMECON. Other abbreviations found in the 
literature dealing with the subject are CEMA and CMEA. 
2 The Charter of COMECON was not officially approved until 1959. 
3 For historical accounts of COMECON, see S. Dell, Trade Blocs and Com-
mon Markets (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 306-321; N. I. Ivanov, Ekono-
micheskoe sotrudnichestvo i vzaiimopomoshch stran sotsialisma (Moscow: 
Izdatelstvo Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1962), pp. 215-275; E. Klink-
miiller and M. Ruban, Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit der Ostblock-
staaten (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1960), pp. l45-2ll; W. von Knorre, 
Zehn jahre Rat fur gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (COMECON) (Wiirzburg: 
Ho1zner Verlag, 1961); F. L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), pp. 207-224; A. D. Stu~ov, ed., Ekono-
micheskoe sotrudnichestvo i vzaiimopomoshch sotsialisticheskzkh stran (Mos-
cow: Izdate1stm Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1962), pp. 4-49; and United Nations 
Doc. E/CONF. 46/31, Vo1s. I and II, 3 Feb. 1964. 
tional specialization, and multilateral trade will therefore be 
analyzed in conjunction with certain political aspects of 
COMECON activities, such as the attitude of individual mem-
ber states toward the organization and their attitudes toward 
the Common Market. 
Because of space limitations, certain problems which are 
marginally connected with COMECON are left out of the dis-
cussion. Such questions as East-West trade and aspects of the 
Sino-Soviet conflict deserve separate treatment, and a detailed 
analysis of economic policies practiced by the organization lies 
beyond the scope of this essay.4 
COMECON came into being on 25 January 1949.5 The 
original signatories of the agreement-Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union-
decided to create an organization for the purpose of providing 
mutual assistance, coordinating foreign trade, furnishing in-
formation about their economies, and exchanging views on 
common experiences. The charter members were eventually 
joined by Albania (February 1949) and East Germany (Sep-
tember 1950) . Yugoslavia participated as an observer at two 
sessions of the COMECON Council between 1956 and 1958. 
China attended the Council for the first time as an observer in 
May 1956, North Korea followed suit a year later, and Mon-
golia and North Vietnam obtained observer status in June 
1958. Mongolia was the one non-European country to become 
a full member in June 1962, after the other Asian countries 
and Albania had ceased attending Council meetings in late 
1961. Cuba apparently began to participate in the work of 
COMECON, as an observer, in 1963. 
In the first few years of its existence, COMECON appears 
4 The author wishes to thank the Academic Senate, University of California, 
Los Angeles, for its support, and his former colleagues at Columbia Univer-
sity, V. Holesovsky, C. Wittich, and A. Wynnyczuk, for their help and advice. 
5 The text of the official announcement appeared in New York Times, 26 
Jan. 1949. 
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to have been simply another organization in the series of 
"transmission belts" linking the Soviet Union with other com-
munist countries in East Central Europe. It seems to have sup-
plemented the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), 
created in September 1947, as another "formal" link between 
Moscow and its European allies. Even today, it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly the reason for the creation of COMECON at 
that particular time. Presumably the organization was de-
signed as an instrument of Soviet control over the East Central 
European economies in response to the Marshall Plan, the es-
tablishment of the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation, and the division of Europe into two camps. It is 
actually rather surprising that the organization was not formed 
even earlier, simultaneously with the Cominform. 
Apart from economic control, there were political reasons 
for creating the organization. The Cominform resolution of 
June 1948 which expelled Yugoslavia from the communist 
camp also marked the end of the period of "domesticism" in 
East Central Europe.6 From then on, each country in the area 
was to follow the Soviet model faithfully in almost every 
sphere of political, economic, and social life. The Cominform 
was supposed to curb "domesticism" by providing an inter-
Party link; COMECON was to perform a corresponding task 
in the field of economics by reducing the divergencies in the 
economic systems of the People's Democracies. Although each 
of the People's Democracies had initiated postwar recovery 
plans, nationalized various economic sectors, introduced land 
reforms, and collectivized agriculture, the extent of the re-
forms and the methods used showed significant variations. 
Differences in economic policies and a certain lack of politi-
cal and institutional uniformity persisted even after the expul-
sion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, and it was not until 
the end of 1948 that the process of Gleichschaltung began to 
make itself felt. It appeared that COMECON, together with 
the Cominform, was to play an important role in the process 
6 z. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 67-83. 
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of building an integTated empire under Soviet control. This 
did not, however, turn out to be the case. 
There were several reasons for the apparent failure of 
COMECON. Stalin, who at that time was at the peak of his 
power, preferred to exercise absolute control over East Central 
Europe in an informal manner through indirect instruments 
of coordination such as bilateral meetings with individual 
party leaders, employment of Soviet military and economic ad-
visers, a secret police network, and similar measures. Whether 
the neglect of formal international organizations such as the 
Cominform or COMECON reflected a Soviet desire not to be 
accused by the West of trying overtly to dominate East Central 
Europe, or whether it simply signified Stalin's dislike or dis-
trust of multilateral organizations, the fact remains that after 
1949 both the Cominform and COMECON became inactive. 
The other major reason for the apparent lack of Soviet in-
terest in COMECON was the fact that the policy of uniform-
ity, initiated in the course of 1948, applied also to economics. 
Although COMECON's officially stated purpose called for 
mutual assistance, coordination of foreign trade, and exchange 
of information and experiences, all of these functions were 
taken over directly by Moscow, which provided the blueprint 
for the bloc's economic policy and was likely to have the final 
say insofar as the preparation and implementation of national 
economic policies were concerned.7 In practice this meant 
concentration on heavy industry, a high rate of investment, 
and fairly rapid collectivization of agriculture. This in turn 
resulted in growing economic autarky and progressive diver-
sion of foreign trade from traditional channels to closer com-
mercial ties with the USSR. The Soviet Union also did not 
hesitate to disregard the interests of the People's Democracies 
7 At least one Communist Party, that of Poland, admitted officially that the 
Soviet Union was instrumental in raising the targets in the Polish Six-Year 
Plan (1949-1955) following the outbreak of the Korean War. The admission 
was made during the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish 
United Workers Party called to re-elect Gomulka to leadership in October 
1956. Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), Vol. X (Oct. 1956). p. 70. 
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and engaged in a variety of exploitative policies.8 In this situ-
ation, COMECON proved to be completely unnecessary. 
Economic coordination and control were conducted on a bi-
lateral basis without any need for a multilateral organization. 
The death of Stalin and the initiation of the "New Course" 
and "peaceful coexistence" in Soviet foreign policy also af-
fected the relationship between the USSR and the People's 
Democracies. The new Soviet leadership found it necessary to 
replace the informal links with other instruments of cohesion. 
The Cominform was allowed to disappear, presumably for 
having been too closely associated with the person of Stalin 
and the expulsion of Yugoslavia. Instead, the Warsaw Treaty, 
the first real multilateral treaty in Eastern Europe, with em-
phasis on political and military matters, was concluded in May 
1955. The Treaty brought into being a new supranational or-
ganization. Apparently at the same time the decision was 
taken to resurrect COMECON as a parallel body concerned 
with formalizing economic links and helping to re-establish 
true unity.9 
Although it had remained in oblivion for the first seven 
years of its existence, COMECON had the signal advantage of 
being "on the books." In the climate of opinion existing in 
the bloc in the years 1956-57, any attempt to create another 
international body probably would have met serious opposi-
tion, particularly from countries most strongly affected by past 
Soviet policies conducted in the name of "proletarian inter-
nationalism." Furthermore, chiefly because of its insignificant 
role, COMECON was not tainted with Stalinism and there-
fore was relatively unobjectionable. 
By 1956 nearly every People's Democracy had completed a 
five- or six-year plan designed to provide a base for a socialist 
society. The fulfillment reports of these plans spoke far more 
s The estimates of actual exploitation vary. The Soviet Union officially ad-
mitted that it was exploiting Poland by paying it less than the world price for 
Polish coal in the period 1946-53. In November 1956 it agreed to make good 
the difference by canceling Polish debts to the USSR incurred prior to 1956. 
Pravda (Moscow), 19 Nov. 1956. 
II For an analysis of this period, see Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 170-171. 
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glowingly about the accomplishments in the field of heavy in-
dustry than about the achievements in agriculture and other 
sectors. More important, however, was the fact that various 
countries were encountering economic problems which ne-
cessitated considerable readjustment of past policies. This was 
true of the Soviet Union as well as of other COMECON coun-
tries, although the difficulties varied in kind and intensity. 
The economic policies undertaken within COMECON in 
the Stalinist period have been described as "war economy" 
measures.10 With emphasis on growth, little attention was paid 
to sectors other than the investment goods industry. The slo-
gan "production for the sake of production" (and one is 
tempted to add "and for the sake of higher indexes") was re-
sponsible for the fact that rational economic accounting was 
ignored in favor of producing almost any commodity at any 
cost. There was no attempt to economize on capital, or on 
labor, which was initially quite plentiful and therefore rela-
tively cheap. As a result, a fairly substantial industrial capacity 
began to emerge in East Central Europe. Yet it soon became 
obvious that this resembled a giant with feet of clay. 
An uncoordinated, autarkic process of growth and a fairly 
identical pattern of industrial expansion gave rise to serious 
shortages in a number of countries. Probably the worst of 
these was the growing shortage of raw materials. With the ex-
ception of the Soviet Union and possibly Romania and Po-
land, East Central Europe is poorly endowed with natural 
resources. In the course of rapid industrialization after 1949, 
hardly any attempt was made to develop new sources of raw 
materials. Thus the expansion of the industrial base was not 
accompanied by a parallel expansion of the raw materials base. 
Actually it is difficult to blame communist planners for this 
oversight. They might have been lulled into a sense of security 
by continuing Soviet deliveries of raw materials. In addition, 
the construction of an electric power plant or a modern forge 
10 Cited in A. Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 
145-146. See also, 0. Lange, "Kierunek: socjalistyczna demokratyzacja," Try-
buna Ludu (Warsaw), 5 Dec. 1956. 
8 
appears much more attractive than the lengthy process of ex-
cavating a new coal mine or prospecting for oil. This psycho-
logical factor should not be ignored. Regardless of their 
ideological commitment, the leaders of the underdeveloped 
countries of East Central Europe were as sensitive to questions 
of prestige and "keeping up with the Joneses" as people else-
where in the world. The "international demonstration ef-
fect"11 seems to exert as powerful an influence in the 
COMECON countries as in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. 
But eventually it became obvious that if the high rate of 
growth was to be maintained, measures would have to be 
taken to alleviate the shortage of raw materials through the 
development of domestic sources, or through imports, or both. 
The second critical shortage was that of labor. It was par-
ticularly acute, although for somewhat different reasons, in 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In other countries, short-
ages of labor began to develop in certain sectors, especially in 
agriculture and some branches of industryY~ This fact re-
quired that more and more emphasis be given to labor-saving 
devices, and in some countries, a shift from labor-intensive to 
capital-intensive industries. Increases in labor productivity 
became one of the crucial tasks of planning commissions with-
in COMECON, necessitating an adjustment in the system of 
incentives, industrial reorganization, and more sophisticated 
planning. 
There is little doubt today that the rather impressive eco-
nomic achievements in East Central Europe were to a large 
extent due to the presence of a highly centralized system of 
controls supplemented by an atmosphere of terror and physi-
cal compulsion. Following the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the USSR in February 1956, there ap-
peared throughout East Central Europe a tendency to aban-
11 See R. Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in the Underdeveloped 
Countries (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), pp. 63·67. Although Nurkse's discussion 
primarily concerns consumption, it can also be applied in a broader sense to 
patterns of industrialization. 
12 See J. M. Montias, Central Planning in Poland (New Haven and London: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 1-6. 
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don or mitigate the old system. It soon became clear that it 
was impossible to restrict the process of liberalization to the 
political arena. There were attempts to replace the high de-
gree of centralization and physical coercion by somewhat more 
sophisticated methods aimed at decentralization of decision-
making and introduction of meaningful economic calculation. 
Both of them de-emphasized punishment in favor of incentive. 
The ultimate result of the new policy was that more attention 
was paid to such problems as price reform, efficiency of invest-
ment, and profitability. Initially this was manifested at the na-
tional rather than the multilateral level. 
The new lease on life given to COMECON appeared to 
make sense on both political and economic grounds. After the 
death of Stalin, and particularly after the events in Poland 
and Hungary, it became obvious that the structure of the bloc 
had to be radically changed. The Soviet government's declara-
tion of 30 October 1956, issued even before the Hungarian 
revolt had reached its apogee, showed that the Soviet leader-
ship was aware of this need for change.13 If the past was to be 
forgotten without loss of the existing formal structure, then 
COMECON, together with the Warsaw Treaty, appeared 
tailor-made for the purpose. 
On economic grounds, COMECON also appeared as a logi-
cal instrument for alleviating a number of problems that be-
gan to emerge following the rapid industrialization drive of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. Better coordination of national 
economic plans and expansion of intra-COMECON trade 
was expected to reduce current difficulties as well as permit 
maintenance of the high rates of growth necessary for the 
building of socialism. 
A decision to strengthen COMECON seems to have been 
made early in the 1960s. The reasons for that decision are as 
obscure as they were for the creation of COMECON in 1949. 
At least two possible causes are worth considering. One of 
these may have been the unquestionable success of the Euro-
13 Pravda, 31 Oct. 1956. 
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pean Economic Community.14 Like Great Britain, COME-
CON initially was highly skeptical about the success of the 
EEC, but began to worry about the future of its foreign trade 
and about being cut off from Western Europe once the EEC 
showed signs of real progress. Thus, at roughly the same time 
that Britain applied for membership in the EEC, the Soviet 
Union began its efforts to make COMECON a tool for closer 
integration of East Central European economies. The main 
purpose of this endeavor was probably to provide a defense 
system against the Common Market. Several COMECON 
members depended on the Common Market as a source of 
supply of machinery and equipment and as an important cus-
tomer for foodstuffs and other products.15 These countries 
realized that once a common agricultural policy was agreed 
upon and a common tariff established, they would be pre-
vented from selling their traditional exports and would be 
unable to acquire machinery necessary for continuing their 
industrial expansion. One can speculate that closer integration 
of COMECON countries was intended to prepare them for 
this eventuality, and at the same time to induce them to search 
for alternative sources of supply and outlets for their exports 
both within and outside COMECON. 
The other reason for still greater emphasis on COMECON 
integration may have been the growing conflict between the 
Soviet Union and China. The USSR, in looking for allies, 
perhaps was seeking to strengthen its base in East Central 
Europe. In view of China's avowed opposition to recent poli-
cies announced by COMECON, one might even go so far as 
to suggest that these policies were purposely aimed at China, 
either as a justification for the reduction of Soviet aid or as a 
warning that an autarkic policy would not be acceptable. 
A more prosaic possibility is that closer integration and 
growing specialization within COMECON were simply a logi-
14 This is the view of M. Shulman in "The Communist States and Western 
Integration," International Organization, Vol. XVII, No. !l (Summer 196!1), 
pp. 650-652 and 6591f. 
Ui See pp. 54 and 57. 
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cal continuation of the process that had begun in 1956. Once 
COMECON was generally accepted by its membership as an 
instrument of international economic cooperation, it was 
bound to expand, both horizontally and vertically. In the 
process of horizontal integration, additional countries were 
invited to participate and additional economic sectors and ac-
tivities (e.g., transport, research, credits and payments) were 
coordinated. Vertical integration involved cooperation "in 
depth" in the preparation of economic plans, in specialization, 
and in foreign trade. 
COMECON has perhaps reached a point where the process 
of integration will acquire a momentum of its own similar to 
that experienced by the Common Market in its early stages. 
At the same time, there are evidences that leaders in the more 
economically advanced countries of COMECON may have 
overreached themselves in their attempt at closer integration. 
The slow rate of progress and emerging opposition of some 
countries to the new policies should not, however, be taken as 
a sign that COMECON has reached the limit of its potentiali-
ties. It is the opinion of this writer that, although COMECON 
may never achieve the success of the EEC, it will probably 
play an increasing role in the economic development of East 
Central Europe. 
12 
........ ______________ __ 
The Institutional Structure 
The institutional framework of COMECON was officially 
described in some detail for the first time in the COMECON 
Charter published in 1960, eleven years after the formation of 
the organization.16 The absence of any detailed framework 
with clearly defined powers indicates that it was modeled 
after the typical Soviet administrative agency, in which the 
institutional setup and the extent of prerogatives are left 
deliberately vague in order to render it impotent.17 It is also 
possible that there was no need for an elaborate organization 
as long as the extent of COMECON activity was restricted to 
a relatively small number of functions. Until the recent reor-
ganization of COMECON's supreme authorities, the most 
important decisions concerning the organization were taken at 
periodic meetings of Communist Party leaders of COMECON 
countries.18 Even today the task of COMECON authorities is 
largely the implementation of decisions made at these confer-
ences. The growing complexity of COMECON may, however, 
require a larger, more specialized organization with progres-
sively expanding authority. 
COMECON can be described as an international organiza-
tion, but it is not yet a supranational organization such as the 
European Coal and Steel Community or the European Eco-
nomic Community. According to the Charter, the member 
countries are not required to surrender any of their sover-
eignty. Each member state possesses one vote, and all decisions 
16 Treaty Series, Vol. 368 (1960) (New York: United Nations, 1961), pp. 264-
285. 
17 R. Jaster, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe," 
World Politics, Vol. XIV, No.3 (Apr. 1962), pp. 506-508. 
18 Such conferences were held in Moscow in May 1958, February 1960, June 
1962, and July 1963. 
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must be approved unanimously. However, in principle, a state 
which declares itself "non-interested" cannot veto an action 
agreed to by others (e.g., on specialization of production in 
some sector). It can only refuse to participate.19 Apparently 
some members took advantage of this provision even before 
Romania's recent opposition.20 
The highest COMECON authorities have been unable to 
issue instructions and regulations directly binding on national 
agencies and individuals in member states. Their decisions 
must first be ratified by members and then incorporated into 
the national law of each country. Apart from the Charter, 
other legal provisions were actually adopted in this manner-
the "General Terms of Delivery of the COMECON, 1958," 
regulating delivery of goods and methods of settling differ-
ences among members, and the 1960 "Convention on Immu-
nities and Privileges of COMECON." It may be assumed, 
however, that sooner or later an attempt will be made to 
overcome this obstacle and to grant the authorities additional 
powers. 
Little is known about the actual decision-making process 
within COMECON. Until recently it looked as if the real 
power within the organization resided in the triangle USSR-
East Germany-Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union often played 
the role of arbiter, and Czechoslovakia and East Germany just 
as often managed to win their point by acting in concert 
against the remaining countries. This has been explained pri-
marily in terms of the Soviet Union's power and the high level 
of economic development of the three countries. According to 
some writers, for some time it was customary for all important 
decisions to be discussed first by the three countries and then 
brought into the plenary session of the COMECON Coun-
cil.21 This view makes sense in the light of the continuing em-
19See United Nations Doc. E/CONF. 46/17,8 Jan. 1964, p. 5. 
20 According to some reports, Bulgaria refused to follow COMECON's rec· 
ommendation concerning the creation of aluminum industry. Comecon and 
the Economy of Eastern Europe (Vienna: Creditanstalt Bankverein, June 
1962), p. 2. 
21 K. Pritzel, Die wirtschaftliche Integration der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
Deutschlands in dem Ostblock und ihre politischen Aspekte (Bonn: Bundesmi-
14 
phasis on specialization within COMECON, which 1s likely 
to benefit mainly these three countries. 
The COMECON Council 
According to the Charter, the supreme organ, the COME-
CON Council, has the statutory power to discuss all problems 
within the jurisdiction of COMECON and to make recom-
mendations and decisions on various issues.22 As indicated 
above, this authority in fact did not amount to much, and in 
1962 a special Executive Committee was added to the insti-
tutional hierarchy and equipped with additional powers. On 
the basis of past performance, it can be said that the work of a 
Council session consists mainly of discussing questions sub-
mitted to it by the various organs of COMECON (for ex-
ample, the Secretariat and Standing Commissions) as well as 
by individual member states, and of providing directives for 
the future work of the various agencies. Occasionally, Council 
sessions have taken place simultaneously with meetings of 
Communist Party and government leaders from member 
countries. The obvious purpose was to implement decisions 
taken at the highest level. 
In theory, ordinary plenary sessions are expected to take 
place twice a year,23 but Table l shows that there were no 
Council sessions from November 1950 to March 1954. Be-
tween December 1955 and June 1958, the Council only met 
twice. The first interval was clearly due to the lack of interest 
in the organization during Stalin's last years and to the diffi-
culties of the transition period following his death. The 
second can perhaps be explained by the unsettled political 
nisterium fiir Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1962), pp. 157-158. A 1956 directive of 
the COMECON Secretariat concerning speciahzation stipulated that construc-
tion of new plants throughout COMECON was to take place on the condition 
that Czechoslovak and East German capacities be fully utilized. 
22 According to Article IV of the Charter, recommendations refer to eco-
nomic, scientific, and technical cooperation, while decisions are supposed to be 
made with regard to organizational and procedural matters. For further dis· 
cussion, see V. Morozov, "Equality: Cornerstone of the Socialist Countries," 
International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. IX (Dec. 1963), pp. 6-7. 
23 Emergency sessions can be called at the request of at least one third of the 
membership. 
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Table I 
COMECON Council Sessions, 1949-63 
No. of Par-
ticipants 
No. Date Place Members Observers Main topics discussed 
I. April26-27, 1949 Moscow 6• 
- Creation of Secretariat 
2. August 25-27, 1949 Sofia 7b 
- Exchange of information and hi-
lateral cooperation 
3. November 24, 1950 Moscow 8· 
- Expansion of foreign trade 
4. March 26-27, 1954 Moscow 8 - Initial steps to coordinate plans 
5. May 26, 1954 Moscow 8 - Coordination of plans 
6. December 7-11, 1955 Budapest 8 - Coordination of plans 
7. May 18-25, 1956 East Berlin 8 2d Coordination of plans and start 
of specialization 
8. June 18-22, 1957 Warsaw 8 3" Coordination of plans and multi-
lateral clearing 
9. June 20-23, 1958 Bucharest 8 4' Development of sources of raw 
materials 
10. December 11-13, 1958 Prague 8 4 Coordination of plans for chemi-
cals 
11. May 13-16, 1959 Tirana 8 4 Coordination of national plans 
for 1961-65 and establishment 
of a common grid 
12. December 10-14, 1959 Sofia 8 4 Approval of Charter and coordi-
nation of plans 
r . -~ ---..... ---~·-···-
13. July 26-30, 1960 Budapest 8 
14. February 28-March 3, 1961 East Berlin 8 
15. December 12-15, 1961 Warsaw 7• 
16. June 6-7, 1962 Moscow 8' 
17. December 14-20, 1962 Bucharest 8 
18. July 24-26, 1963 Moscow 8 
• Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. 
• Albania joined in April 1949. 
• East Germany joined in September 1950. 
4 China and Yugoslavia attended as observers. 
• North Korea attended as observer. 
4 
4 
p 
t North Vietnam and Mongolia attended as observers; Yugoslavia was absent. 
• Albania did not attend. 
• China, North Korea, and North Vietnam did not attend. 
1 Mongolia joined as .full member. 
Coordination of 20-year plans 
and cooperation in agriculture 
Specialization; cooperation in 
transportation; norms and stand-
ards 
Specialization in output of ships 
and chemicals 
Establishment of Executive Com-
mittee and publication of "Basic 
Principles of the International 
Socialist Division of Labor" 
Approval of multilateral pay-
ments and creation of Interna-
tional Bank 
Coordination of plans for 1966-70 
SouRCEs: W. von Knorre, Zehn Jahre Rat fiir gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (COMECON), op. cit., pp. 6 and 12; New York 
Times, 22 Dec. 1962 and 27 July 1963; F. L. Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist Bloc: 
A Survey," Soviet Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Oct. 1959), pp. 174-179; and A. Stupov, ed., Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnich-
estvo i vzailmopomoshch sotsialisticheskikh stran, op. cit., pp. 18, 43, and 45. 
situation that followed the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party and was not brought under control until 
the 1957 Moscow meeting of the eleven ruling Communist 
Parties. 
The Council meetings are held in different capitals of 
COMECON states and are attended by delegations from the 
member countries as well as by observers from other countries 
who have been invited by the full membership.24 The Council 
has held eighteen official meetings (see Table I) . Sessions have 
seldom lasted longer than three or four days, with the excep-
tion of the seventh, which lasted a week.25 This can mean 
either that there was relatively little to discuss, or that all 
controversial issues had been thrashed out in bilateral or 
multilateral conferences among Party leaders. The last offici-
ally reported session of the Council took place in July 1963. 
The recent formation of the Executive Committee may mean 
that the Council will meet less frequently than before. 
The Executive Committee 
The Executive Committee was formed at the Moscow meet-
ing of Communist Party leaders from COMECON countries 
in June 1962. It replaced the former statutory body, the Con-
ference of Representatives of Member Countries, and, as the 
highest executive organ of COMECON, was entrusted with 
the implementation of policies agreed upon at the plenary 
sessions of the COMECON Council. It is composed of perma-
nent representatives of each country who hold the rank of 
Deputy Prime Minister and are expected to devote themselves 
entirely to COMECON work. The chairmanship of the Com-
mittee rotates every four months. According to press reports, 
24 In some cases, observer participation does not seem to have been ex-
tended to all COMECON 'bodies. 
25 There is little doubt that this session was one of the most crucial meetings 
in the life of COMECON. It not only created twelve Standing Commissions, 
thus bringing experts from different countries to work together on a permanent 
basis for the first time, but it also initiated the program of specialization by 
allocating the production of about 600 types of machines among individual 
members. 
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the Committee has met more or less on schedule every two 
months since its formation. 26 
The Committee's functions include coordination of na-
tional economic plans, investment programs, and trade poli-
cies as well as over-all direction of scientific, technological, and 
economic research. Directly subordinate to the Committee is 
the Office on Joint Problems of Economic Planning, with a 
membership consisting of the deputy chairmen of national 
planning commissions. The chief task of this Office is to pro-
vide data for the Committee's coordination of plans and to 
maintain liaison among national planning commissionsY 
According to official comments from COMECON sources, 
the Executive Committee was to be endowed with far greater 
powers than the Conference of Representatives.28 There was 
talk of amending the Charter in order to incorporate the new 
body, but no such amendment has taken place. One may 
speculate that at the June 1962 meeting of Party leaders of the 
COMECON countries the Soviet Union envisaged the new 
Committee as a supranational body. 29 Such a move may have 
been blocked by overt resistance from Romania and a luke-
warm reception from Poland and Hungary. There is no evi-
dence that such a decision was actually reached. The new 
Committee therefore does not appear to differ significantly 
from the old Conference of Representatives, although it is 
quite possible that it received additional powers to deal with 
a number of questions previously handled by the plenary ses-
sions of the Council. With the growth of COMECON agen-
cies, more controversial questions were likely to come up for 
discussion, and it was felt that some of these could not wait 
for the plenary session of the Council, which meets only twice 
a year and is not equipped to deal with details. 
26 The twelfth meeting of the Committee took place in Moscow on 21-25 
Apr. 1964. Pravda, 26 Apr. 1964. 
27 United Nations Doc. E/CONF. 46/17, 8 Jan. 1964, p. 5. 
28 Morozov, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
29 N. S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist 
World System," World Marxist Review (Toronto), Vol. V (Sept. 1962), pp. 
10-11. 
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The Secretariat 
The creation of a Secretariat was foreshadowed in the state-
ment announcing the formation of COMECON in January 
1949. But it was not until the seventh Council session in May 
1956 that the Secretariat came to the forefront of a resurgent 
COMECON. The task of the Secretariat, according to the 
Charter, is to prepare the agenda for the plenary sessions of 
the COMECON Council and meetings of the Executive Com-
mittee and other agencies, coordinate the work of the Stand-
ing Commissions and other ad hoc committees, and conduct 
research and prepare reports and statistical data. 
The headquarters of the Secretariat is in Moscow. There 
appears to be confusion about its size, perhaps as a result of 
various statements made about the numbers of the citizens of 
member countries "participating" in the work of COMECON 
organizations. Some sources claim that the number of em-
ployees exceeds 2,000,30 while others estimate the number at 
400.81 The lower figure appears more credible, unless experts 
attending commissions, working parties, and other bodies are 
included. There is little doubt, however, that the number of 
Secretariat employees will increase with the growth of the or-
ganization itsel£.32 
It has been impossible to obtain detailed information about 
Secretariat total costs, the allocation of expenses among indi-
vidual member states, geographic distribution of employees, 
so Knorre, op. cit., p. 15. The estimate apparently came from Swedish sources. 
31 As of the winter of 1964, the Secretariat was supposed to have employed 
420 persons. Prior to June 1962, the figure was about 200. P. Jaroszewicz, 
··o kierunkach pracy RWPG," Zycie Gospodarcze (Warsaw), Vol. XIX, No. 4 
(26 Jan. 1964), p. 6. The author is the Polish delegate to the Executive Com· 
mittee. In the period 1960-61, over 10,000 persons were supposedly employed in 
COMECON agencies. E. Hoffmann, Comecon, der gemeinsame Markt in Ost-
europa (Opladen: Leske, 1961), p. 16. 
32 One indication of potential growth is the fact that a new headquarters 
for the Secretariat is being constructed in Moscow. According to COMECON 
press accounts, the new building was to 1be 27 floors high and scheduled to be 
completed in 1965. Zycie Gospodarcze, Vol. XVIII, No. 32 (11 Aug. 1963), p. I. 
20 
and recruitment policies.ss Available evidence indicates that 
the Secretariat performs roughly the same functions as the 
secretariats of other international organizations. 
The Secretariat is headed by Secretary N. V. Fadeyev, the 
former Soviet Minister of Finance, assisted by three Deputy 
Secretaries. These officials are able to influence COMECON 
proceedings by directing the Secretariat's coordinating func-
tions and by attending the meetings of COMECON organs. 
The composition of the Secretariat is therefore of special in-
terest; it is probable that nationals of individual member 
states attempt to obtain preferential treatment for their coun-
tries in such sensitive areas as international specialization or 
joint investment projects. 
The Standing Commuriom 
The Standing Commissions comprise the fourth major 
organ of COMECON. They are composed of experts drawn 
from the member states, and their main task is to work out 
details of policies agreed upon by the higher authorities, 
namely, the Council and the Executive Committee. Table 2 
indicates that most of the Commissions deal with fairly narrow 
branches of economic activity. They are mainly concerned 
with coordination of production plans, establishment of prior-
ities for outputs of certain key products, formulation of for-
eign trade agreements, and selection of new investment 
projects. 
Although there is no statutory definition of their jurisdic-
tion, the Standing Commissions have the right to submit pro-
posals to plenary sessions of the Council and to the Executive 
Committee and are expected to provide annual reports of 
their activities as well as their plans. Each Commission has a 
ss Apparently the cost of maintaining the Secretariat is allocated among the 
members by 'plenary sessions of the Council. The number of Secretariat em-
ployees from each member country is determined by its population. Soviet 
citizens are supposed to account for 70 per cent of the employees. Knorre, op. 
cit., pp. 15-16. Jaroszewicz, op. cit., states that Poland's share was about 15 per 
cent. 
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Table 2 
COMECON Standing Commissions, 1956-63 
No. Field of Activity Year of Creation Headquarters 
I. Coal 1956 Warsaw 
2. Electricity 1956 Moscow 
3. Oil and Gas 1956 Bucharest 
4. Ferrous Metallurgy 1956 Moscow 
5. Non-ferrous Metallurgy 1956 Budapest 
6. Chemicals 1956 East Berlin 
7. Machine Building 1956 Prague 
8. Agriculture 1956 Sofia 
9. Foreign Trade 1956 Moscow 
10. General Economic Questions 1958 Moscow 
II. Transportation 1958 Warsaw 
12. Building and Construction 1958 East Berlin 
13. Light Industry 1958 Prague 
14. Atomic Energy 1960 Unknown 
15. Statistics 1962 Unknown 
16. Coordination of Research 1962 Unknown 
17. Standardization 1962 East Berlin 
18. Finance and Foreign Exchange 1962 Unknown 
19. Electronics 1962 Unknown 
20. GeoioyY 1962 Unknown 
21. Food ndustry 19628 Unknown 
a Untill962, one commission handled both light industry and food production. 
SouRcE: F. L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit. pp. 255· 
257; N. Fadeyev, "Strany SEV krepyat ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo." 
Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, No. 10 (1963), p. 10. 
secretariat of its own, responsible to, and financed by, the 
Secretariat of COMECON. The chairmanship of each Com-
mission is usually held by a representative of the host coun-
try.s4 
The Standing Commissions, according to Article VIII of the 
Charter, are created by plenary sessions of the Council (see 
84 Knorre, op. cit., pp. 1!1-14. Little is known about the size of individual 
commissions. In some cases they have been said to employ as many as 200 per-
sons, although this may again illustrate some confusion between "employees" 
and officials of member countries participating in the work of the Commissions. 
F. L. Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist 
Bloc: A Survey," Soviet Studies (Glasgow), Vol. XI, No. 2 (Oct. 1959), p. ISO. 
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Table 2). The first twelve Commissions were formed at the 
seventh session in May 1956. Since then Commissions have 
been dissolved or absorbed by others, and additional Commis-
sions have been formed.35 
The growth in the number of Standing Commissions can 
be taken as an indicator of progress toward integration within 
COMECON. The creation of the first twelve Commissions 
coincided with a new stage in the activity of the organization. 
Prior to 1956, experts from different countries met periodi-
cally to discuss various problems, but these meetings were or-
ganized ad hoc, and the liaison among COMECON members 
was very tenuous. The creation of the Standing Commissions 
in 1956 provided a permanent framework for mutual discus-
sion for the first time, and thus laid a base for the forthcom-
ing expansion of COMECON activities. Not only are the 
Standing Commissions handling additional areas of economic 
activity, but they recently seem to have been given more 
authority to deal with the most pressing matters in certain 
key sectors.36 Additional Commissions presumably will be 
created in the course of the next few years to accommodate 
the growing amount of coordination among COMECON 
economies. 
The expansion of COMECON's institutional setup pro-
vides an ever-broadening forum for discussion of mutual prob-
lems that brings the weaker members closer together. It was 
85 The Geology Commission and the Wood, Cellulose, and Paper Commis-
sion--both created in 1956-were dissolved in 1959. Knorre, op. cit., p. 14. The 
Geology Commission was re-created in 1962. According to Polish sources, by 
spring 1964, 25 Standing Commissions were in existence. Z. Keh, "Wazniejsze 
problemy wspolpracy w R WPG," Zycie Gospodarcze, Vol. XIX, No. 11 (15 Mar. 
1964) , p. I. It has been possible to identify only 21 Commissions in Table 2. 
Conceivably the existence of some Commissions (e.g., armaments industry) 
was never made public. 
36 Following the June 1962 meeting of Party leaders of COMECON coun-
tries, it was decided to "improve" the work of certain Commissions, particularly 
those dealing with machine building, chemical industry, and foreign trade. 
These Commissions were to create a special executive committee, composed of 
delegates with the rank of vice-minister, which was to meet two to three times 
a year. A. Bodnar, "Rok 1962-przelomowy w rozwoju RWPG," Gospodarka 
Planowa (Warsaw), Vol. XVIII Qan. 1963), p. 16. 
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an axiom of Stalinist policy to apply the rule of divide et 
impera to East Central Europe, but there are indications that 
a reverse process has been in existence for a number of years. 
By working together in various COMECON agencies, repre-
sentatives of East Central European countries have had the 
opportunity to learn more about each other and to realize that 
by forming a united front they can mitigate, to a large extent, 
the superior power of the senior member. 
COMECON is also beginning to acquire vested interests of 
its own. The longer it exists and the more it expands, the hard-
er it will be for the Soviet Union to abolish COMECON 
without antagonizing the rest of the membership. Actually, 
present indications seem to point to the fact that the Soviet 
Union is interested in maintaining and even expanding the 
organization. The quiet shelving of the Soviet proposal to 
strengthen the authority of COMECON does not indicate 
that other members were opposed to the proposal as such but 
rather to specific policies that the organization was about to 
undertake. 
The formation of an International Bank,37 which began 
operations on 1 January 1964, is indicative of the continuing 
interest in expanding the institutional framework of COME-
CON. This, in turn, is likely to increase the stature of the or-
ganization and make it a significant factor in the economic as 
well as the political life of East Central Europe. 
37 See below, pp. 58-39. 
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The Policies 
The stated purposes of COMECON were to engage in eco-
nomic cooperation, expand foreign trade, and exchange 
information about common experiences. But because the or-
ganization remained practically dormant from 1949-56, it is 
almost impossible to discern whether it played any serious role 
in the economic policies of East Central Europe during that 
interval. Since 1956, however, and particularly since 1960, the 
influence of COMECON has become visible in several spheres 
of economic activity throughout the area. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to examine some of these spheres. The order in 
which particular policies are discussed is fairly arbitrary. The 
hierarchy of policies has not remained constant, and different 
policies and programs have been emphasized at various times. 
No attempt has been made to provide statistical information, 
since that is readily available from a number of sources indi-
cated in the notes. Instead, the discussion will concentrate on 
the broader and occasionally more controversial aspects of 
COMECON policies. 
Intra-COMECON Trade 
One of the complaints that constantly appears in COME-
CON publications concerns the slow growth of intra-bloc 
trade.38 The reasons for this are obvious. In the decade follow-
38 For a thorough treatment of problems in intra-COMECON trade, see 
F. L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit., pp. 23-205; R. L. 
Allen, "An Interpretation of East-West Trade," in Comparisons of the United 
States and Soviet Economies, Report of Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 403-426; P. H. Thunberg, "The Soviet 
Union in the World Economy," in Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, Re-
port of Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: GPO, 
1962) , pp. 409·438, as well as sources listed in footnote 3 above. 
25 
'I.',; 
,,'I 
:~ l 
I il il 
:i 
il 
1r: 
ing World \Var II, the economies of the countries of East 
Central Europe developed along similar patterns. This left 
little scope for mutually advantageous trade except possibly 
in raw materials. Individual countries in East Central Europe 
were also reluctant to rely on foreign trade to any large extent 
in the fear that nonfulfillment of obligations by other coun-
tries might be instrumental in the breakdown of their own 
national plans.39 As a result, the ratios of foreign trade to na-
tional income in each COMECON country and the volume of 
foreign trade per head of population have been generally be-
low comparable figures for Western Europe. 
There were also other considerations that inhibited the 
growth of trade. The system of bilateral trade agreements ob-
viously militated against trade expansion, as did the lack of 
convertibility. The absence of a rational price system pre-
vented any calculation of comparative advantage and thus 
made it still more difficult to engage in trade. Finally, political 
considerations, particularly those governing trade between the 
Soviet Union and certain COMECON countries before 1953, 
also served as a brake on increases in commercial relations. 
The decision in 1956 to expand intra-bloc trade was part of 
the over-all attempt to breathe new life into COMECON. It 
was hoped that the increased emphasis on specialization and 
coordination of national economic plans would almost auto-
matically result in expansion of trade in accordance with the 
principle of comparative advantage. Other measures taken to 
accelerate expansion consisted of the introduction of a limited 
multilateral payments system and attempts to bring about a 
comprehensive reform of prices used in COMECON trade. 
The success of the Common Market undoubtedly provided 
an additional stimulus in that direction. 
39 In 195~-54, following the introduction of the "New Course," the less de-
veloped members of COMECON (Poland, Romania, Hungary) decided to cut 
down on import of machinery from and export of foodstuffs to the more ad-
vanced member (Czechoslovakia). In 1956 Poland curtailed the export of coal 
to Czechoslovakia and East Germany, despite prior agreement. J. M. Montias. 
"Uniformity and Diversity in the East European Future," Paper delivered at 
the First National Convention of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Slavic Studies, New York, Apr. 1964, pp. 7-10. 
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In order to expedite trade within COMECON, the Stand-
ing Commission on Foreign Trade issued a document entitled 
"General Conditions for COMECON Deliveries, 1958" which 
was to provide a base for uniform treatment of various prob-
lems connected with the movement of goods within the area 
(contract procedures, delivery dates, quality control, and 
packaging). These regulations were supplemented in 1962 by 
two others-"General Conditions for COMECON Assembly 
Work, 1962" and "General Conditions for COMECON Tech-
nical Servicing, 1962"-which were concerned particularly 
with problems arising in transactions within machine build-
ing industries.4o 
At the December 1963 meeting of the Executive Commit-
tee, it was also decided to start work on a reform of COME-
CON foreign trade prices. The latter is probably one of the 
most interesting and controversial aspects of foreign trade 
within COMECON. According to official pronouncements, 
the prices currently applicable to COMECON international 
transactions are based on adjusted average world market 
prices for 1957.41 Apparently the Executive Committee de-
cided that changes in world prices since 1958 were of a secular 
rather than a cyclical or speculative character and that the 
growing disparity between COMECON and world prices 
should be corrected. The new reform, which is initially to be 
carried out on a bilateral basis, is to take into account average 
world prices for the period 1960-64, with special emphasis on 
prices in the terminal year.42 Thus it can be expected that the 
discrepancy between COMECON and world market prices 
40 United Nations Doc. E/CONF. 46/17, 8 Jan. 1964, pp. 13-14. 
41 The validity of this statement has been the subject of controversy among 
economists in the United States. See H. Mendershausen, "The Terms of Soviet-
Satellite Trade: A Broadened Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, Vol. XLII, No.2 (May 1960), and "The Terms of Trade of Soviet-Satellite 
Trade: 1955-1959" (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., Mar. 1962), and F. D. 
Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the Question of Discrimination: 
A 'Customs Union' Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
XLIV, No. 2 (May 1962). On the basis of his examination of Polish foreign 
trade data, this writer generally supports Holzman's view. 
42 P. Jaroszewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid-An Instrument 
of Cooperation Between Socialist Countries," World Marxist Review, Vol. VII 
(Mar. 1964), p. 8. 
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will be lessened. It is clear, however, that because of the length 
of time it takes to conduct price reform in planned economies, 
reductions will not keep pace with changes in world prices, 
and the gap is likely to increase again.43 The Commission 
on General Economic Questions has been working on the 
problems of inter-member cost comparison and the principles 
on which a COMECON price structure should be built. 
It is difficult to say whether all of the measures mentioned 
above will result in any significant increase in trade within 
COMECON. Judging by the limited character of the re-
forms, no breakthrough has been achieved. Perhaps none was 
ever intended. It is a little too early to form a definitive judg-
ment, since some of the measures have been put into effect 
only recently (for example, limited convertibility), and some 
are only in the preparatory stage (for example, price reform). 
Nevertheless, it appears that outside factors rather than in-
ternal reforms may ultimately stimulate intra-bloc trade. The 
final establishment of the Common Market tariff wall may 
do more for the expansion of trade than a whole series of re-
forms that do not really go to the heart of the matter. 
Coordination of Plaru 
The first serious attempt at achieving systematic coordina-
tion of national economic plans probably can be traced back 
to the crucial seventh COMECON Council session, held in 
East Berlin in May 1956. Prior to that date, coordination ex-
isted only on a bilateral basis outside the COMECON frame-
work.44 The seventh session set up a number of Standing 
Commissions whose task originally was to be the coordination 
of national production plans for the period 1956-60. A year 
later, the eighth session (Warsaw, June 1957) called for the 
coordination of plans for the years 1960-65. Preparations were 
also made to start work on long-range plans up to 1980. Ac-
cording to a Soviet thesis, coordination of long-term plans 
43 It was reported in January that the reform of foreign trade prices had 
been postponed until 1965. New York Times, 21 Jan. 1964. 
44 Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit., p. 206. 
2& 
1 
was to be the single most important task of COMECON .45 
The advantages of coordination were thought to be primarily 
the avoidance of nonrational parallel development, the full 
utilization of resources, and reduction of costs through the 
introduction of techniques of mass production. While cooper-
ation was particularly vital in the field of raw materials and 
in the machine building industry, other sectors, such as agri-
culture and transport, were not to be neglected. 
The year 1962 appears to have been the watershed for co-
ordination of plans. During that year, the question of closer 
cooperation in planning was discussed at a conference of 
Communist Party leaders from COMECON countries and 
at the sixteenth Council session (both held in June), and at 
two meetings of the newly created Executive Committee (in 
July and September). In addition, the organization published 
the "Basic Principles of Socialist International Division of 
Labor," and an article by Premier Khrushchev dealing with 
the subject of coordination and integration appeared at 
roughly the same time. 46 
Even before 1962 some COMECON members had ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the organiza-
tion in this particular fie1d.47 The mediocre showing of 
COMECON was blamed on the fact that the organization 
linked countries with very unequal levels of economic de-
velopment.48 Individual member states were faced with dif-
ferent problems and tasks, making multilateral coordination 
difficult. The existent coordination was based on bilateral 
or trilateral agreements (e.g., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
East Germany) • 
Before 1962 coordination simply meant that member coun-
tries compared production plans of key commodities, their 
45 B. Miroshnichenko, "Kooperatsiia narodno-khoziaystvennykh planov sot-
sialisticheskikh stran," Voprosy Ekonomiki (Moscow), No. 3 (1960), pp. 31-43. 
46 Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 3-19. 
47 The notable example was Poland. Speaking at the Fifth Plenum of the 
Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party in June 1960, Gomul-
ka complained that, except for foreign trade, there was little or no cooperation 
among COMECON members. Trybuna Ludu, 22 June 1960. 
48 Bodnar, op. cit., pp. 12-16. 
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planned exports and imports, and long-range plans for the 
development of some industries. This comparison made it 
possible to find tangential points of mutual interest and was 
followed by discussions regarding possible solutions, which 
implied that some sort of coordination had been achieved. As 
a rule, by the time the negotiations took place, national plans 
already had been approved by the highest authorities in each 
country. Broader coordination was therefore impossible with-
out amending the plan. Some corrections were introduced in 
the annual trade agreements, but they were not significant. 
At the various meetings held during 1962, it was also de-
cided to pay greater attention to such problems as rates of 
growth, the burden of investment in individual countries, 
and the mutual foreign trade obligations of COMECON 
members. Initial consultations concerning plans for 1970-80 
also began to take place at this time.49 
Furthermore, closer coordination was to be undertaken 
with regard to the labor force. Poland and Bulgaria had to 
find additional jobs because of demographic pressure, while 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany were trying to relieve 
labor shortages through mechanization and automation. 
These difficulties could be eliminated and considerable sav-
ings of resources achieved if labor were permitted to move 
from Poland to Czechoslovakia, for example, or if Czech fac-
tories were built in Poland. 5° 
Some countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and East Ger-
many, apparently have been willing to finance the creation 
and expansion of extractive industries in other member 
countries. The loans are to be repaid in kind, by exports of 
raw materials.51 
49 By early 1964 the work on coordinating long-range plans to 1980 had made 
little progress because some countries were behind in the preparation of their 
plans. Jaroszewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid ... ," op. cit., p. 4. 
50 During a trip across East Germany in the summer of 1961, the author 
was told that an unsuccessful attempt had been made to induce Bulgarian 
and Polish workers to move to East Germany prior to 1961. 
51 Czechoslovakia lent Poland over $200 million to develop coal, copper, 
and sulphur mines, and East Germany granted Poland $100 million to ex-
pand output of brown coal. Poland, in turn, devoted about $85 million in 
80 
The discussions concerning a closer integration of planning 
were summarized by Premier Khrushchev in the article men-
tioned above. After stating that COMECON had matured 
enough to be able to undertake joint planning on a much 
larger scale, the Soviet leader indicated that the June 1962 
conference of Party leaders of COMECON countries had de-
cided to grant the organization greater authority in that field. 
Prior to that conference, closer coordination had been im-
possible for two reasons: the COMECON authorities had in-
sufficient statutory powers, and they lacked sufficient statisti-
cal and other data. According to Khrushchev, this would now 
be changed. Closer coordination in conjunction with stricter 
adherence to the international division of labor, joint finan-
cing of common enterprises, and the integration of national 
investment programs should result in "building the socialist 
world economy as a single entity."52 
Neither in Khrushchev's article nor in any other statement 
emanating from COMECON sources was the new policy 
spelled out in detail. The opposition, which came to the sur-
face the following year, suggests that the newly formed Ex-
ecutive Committee was to have authority to overrule the re-
sistance of certain COMECON members to the allocation 
of resources considered optimum by more powerful mem-
bers. In other words, the new body was to become the first 
supranational agency of COMECON and was to modify the 
principle of absolute economic sovereignty of individual 
member states. Khrushchev's reference to the possibility of 
reallocation of investment funds from country to country 
was indicative of the new powers to be given COMECON. 
Closer integration of production and investment plans, to-
gether with greater emphasis on specialization, could only be 
attained if member states agreed to surrender some of their 
196!$ to developing the Soviet fertilizer industry. K. Olszew.i, "0 wspoldzial-
aniu krajow RWPG," Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), Vol. XVIII (Feb. 1964), pp. 
85-86. For other examples of joint undertakings, see Table 3. 
52 Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 9. According to Khrushchev, "it may well be that 
we shall have to re-switch some of the allocations [for capital building] from 
country to country, on mutually acceptable conditiOns, of course, for the in-
terested countries." Ibid., p. 10. 
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sovereignty for the good of all the members of COMECON. 
Apparently, Khrushchev was determined to achieve this. At 
least during the remainder of 1962, there was no indication 
that his plan would not be fulfilled.53 
Whether because of the opposition of China, Romania, 
and other countries or for some unknown reason, it appears 
that sometime in early 1963 the original supporters of closer 
integration began to experience a change of heart. The offi-
cial communique issued in Moscow after the July 1963 meet-
ing of Communist Party leaders of COMECON countries did 
not mention the need for establishing a joint planning 
agency and indicated that the problem was not as simple as 
it originally might have appeared. Instead, the conference 
agreed that it would be better to proceed with closer inte-
gration by organizing, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in-
ternational cartels in which all interested parties could par-
ticipate.54 The tenor of the statement suggested that the idea 
of a supranational organ had been abandoned for the time 
being. 
Some of the reasons for shelving the whole concept were 
explained during late 1963 and early 1964. According to 
some sources, planning on COMECON's scale would require 
concentrating output in countries having the greatest advan-
tage for the production of a given group of commodities. 
Some COMECON countries would, in turn, be faced with a 
permanent deficit in their balance of payments, and this 
would create an impossible situation in the long run. Fur-
thermore, it was claimed that in some industries, particularly 
in machine building, the scale of operations bore little rela-
tion to costs. Thus, the chief argument in favor of integration 
and specialization-that only some countries should pro-
53 Some writers claim that the idea of establishing a supranational plan-
ning agency was abandoned at the seventeenth COMECON Council session 
in December 1962. M. Gamarnikow, "Comecon Today," East Europe, Vol. 
XIII (Mar. 1964), p. 5. 
54 "Z lipcowej narady RWPG," Zycie Gospodarcze, Vol. XVIII, No. 32 
(11 Aug. 1963) , p. 1. 
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duce certain products and achieve economies of scale-was 
deemed spurious.55 
The argument against the creation of a COMECON plan-
ning board was carried still further at a conference of leading 
economists from member states held in Prague. The partici-
pants at the meeting came to the following conclusion: 
Crystallization of a common economy based on common prop-
erty and free of state frontiers is a matter for the very distant 
future. Any attempt to create such an economy at present, any 
artificial acceleration of objective processes, far from being a step 
forward would greatly damage the common cause . ... The de-
velopment of the socialist world system is a natural historical proc-
ess involving a succession of phases and stages which cannot be 
bypassed at will .... 56 
This is where the matter stands today. At least for the 
time being, probably no further attempt will be made to 
achieve closer coordination of COMECON economies from 
the top down. Instead cooperation from the bottom up ap-
parently will be tried. Under this arrangement, two or more 
countries will agree to coordinate their plans and to divide 
outputs of individual commodities among themselves. This 
is in fact maintenance of the status quo, since bilateral co-
ordination within COMECON has been in existence for a 
number of years. In June 1962, Premier Khrushchev had 
stated that "the socialist world system is now at a stage when 
it is no longer possible correctly to chart its development by 
merely adding up the national economies,"57 but in 1963 
and 1964 it appeared that it was possible to do so after all. 
While the issue of national sovereignty seems to have been 
the chief obstacle in creating a COMECON planning agency, 
it is also probable that COMECON economists have con-
cluded that closer integration is not feasible for economic 
reasons, at least not before some far-reaching economic re-
forms have been undertaken. As long as the organization 
55 S. Kuzinski, "Wezlowe problemy wspolpracy," Zycie Gospodarcze, No. 
46 (17 Nov. 1963), p. 3. 
56 "The Socialist World System of Economy and the Laws Governing Its 
Development," World Marxist Review, Vol. VII (Apr. 1964), pp. 57-58. 
57 Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 5. 
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does not have adequate cost and price data at its disposal, it 
is clearly impossible to achieve the most efficient allocation of 
resources. This means that in the near future coordination of 
production, even on a bilateral basis, will have to be con-
ducted in a more or less ad hoc manner.~8 
S peciali:lation 
Following the June 1962 conference of Party leaders from 
COMECON countries, the process of international speciali-
zation, which began at the seventh COMECON Council ses-
sion in 1956, culminated in the publication of the "Basic 
Principles of the Socialist International Division of Labor."59 
This document enumerated the official reasons for closer ad-
herence to the principles of division of labor. within the or-
ganization, and its conclusions made good sense. Specializa-
tion was necessary because of rapid technological progress, 
the need to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources, 
and its possible contribution to a better utilization of avail-
able research facilities. Specialization made sense because of 
national differences in endowment of natural resources, and 
because it was the only way to equalize the level of economic 
development in all socialist countries. 
The concept of the socialist international division of labor 
was elaborated further by Premier Khrushchev in his famous 
article. After restating the rna jor points listed in the June 
1962 "Basic Principles," he again stressed the need for closer 
coordination and specialization. Obviously, the two were 
closely linked. National economic plans would have to be 
integrated on the basis of an allocation of outputs previously 
agreed upon by individual members. The additional powers 
to be granted to COMECON might also cover a determina-
~8 For comprehensive discussions of these problems, see E. Neuberger, 
"Soviet Economic Integration: Some Suggested Explanations for Slow Pro-
gress" (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., July 1963), and "International Division 
of Labor in CEMA: Limited Regret Strategy," American Economic Review, 
Vol. LIV, No. 3 (May 1964), pp. 506-515; and Pryor, The Communist Foreign 
Trade System, op. cit., pp. 206-223. 
ISO Pravda, 17 June 1962. 
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tion of the "product mix" each country was to produce. Al-
though according to Premier Khrushchev the Soviet Union 
was big enough to produce everything, it "was prepared 
even to cut down production of certain types of manufacture 
should it be found more expedient to manufacture them in 
the other member-countries of the Council."60 
Like most of the other activities discussed above, the 
serious attempt at specialization began in May 1956. At that 
time it was decided to recommend that the production of 
some 600 types of machinery and equipment be allocated 
among individual members. Since 1956, successive Council 
sessions have discussed specialization in other areas of pro-
duction, including raw materials and semi-manufactured 
goods.61 Specialization seems to have progressed farthest in 
the machine building industry, where the number of items 
subject to specialization agreements has nearly doubled since 
1956, reaching the figure of 1,200.62 At the end of 1962, of 
2,500 kinds of industrial equipment, only 300 were produced 
in more than one country.6a 
Judging by the reaction of individual member countries, 
the objection to further specialization is based on roughly 
the same considerations as those inhibiting a closer integra-
tion of economic plans. This is not surprising, since the two 
are closely intertwined. The various specialization agree-
ments are based almost entirely on the existing pattern of 
economic development. Countries with a relatively well-
developed industrial base were to be given the task of ex-
panding it, while those which had been unable to catch up 
with the more advanced countries were generally to continue 
in their present status as purveyors of raw materials. Apart 
from this division between producers of raw materials and 
producers of finished goods, there also was to be greater 
80 Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 13. 
61 For a list of COMECON specialization agreements, see Pryor, The Com-
munist Foreign Trade System, op. cit., pp. 260-266. 
62 Jaroszewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid ... ," op. cit., p. 7. 
63 S. Jedrychowski, "The Economic Effects of the International Socialist 
Division of Labor," World Marxist Review, Vol. VI (Mar. 1963), p. 4. 
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specialization within individual branches of industry, par-
ticularly in machine building. Thus far specialization has been 
limited to final products and here, too, there has been no 
change in the existing pattern of manufacturing. A further 
inhibiting factor has been the absence of long-term agree-
ments guaranteeing delivery of needed machines by the 
producer to the importer.64 Naturally, no country was eager 
to stop producing a particular kind of equipment unless it 
could be assured of delivery by the country chosen to be the 
chief or only producer. Here again, the absence of a supra-
national enforcement agency to ensure performance was a 
significant factor. A problem that limits specialization but 
does not affect closer coordination of plans seems to be that 
comparative advantage is a dynamic concept while present 
specialization agreements have a purely static character. Be-
cause of this, the specialization policy of COMECON mem-
bers has been defined as a "limited regret strategy." This 
enables the COMECON countries "to reap the benefits of 
comparative advantage in those cases where the benefits ap-
pear so obvious as not to require any serious economic calcu-
lations, and in other cases to obtain the benefits of internal 
economies of scale."65 
As in the case of closer coordination of plans, a change of 
heart concerning multilateral specialization appears to have 
taken place since 1962. According to the Polish delegate to 
the COMECON Executive Committee, 
exact definition of the place of the various countries in the over-
all system of international specialization and coordination is a 
matter of the future. The recommendations of the industrial 
committees [Standing Commissions] are not enough for this.66 
More comprehensive specialization agreements are to be 
reached in the process of coordinating plans for 1966-70, but 
like coordination itself, they are to begin at the bottom, 
64 Bodnar, op. cit., p. 15. 
65 Neuberger, "International Division of Labor in CEMA: Limited Regret 
Strategy," op. cit., p. 515. 
66 Jaroszewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid ... ," op. cit., p. 7. 
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through bilateral agreements. Apparently COMECON again 
discovered that "bilateral cooperation was indispensable."67 
For the time being, there probably will not be any rapid 
increase in across-the-board specialization in COMECON. 
Instead, two or three member countries may agree to special-
ize in the production of a particular commodity. Such co-
operation has existed for some time and has apparently 
proved satisfactory. 
Multilateral Payments 
The predominant, if not the sole, method of financing intra-
COMECON trade has been bilateral clearing. Its drawbacks, 
however, have become more pronounced in the light of grow-
ing emphasis on trade expansion and specialization. The 
most serious impediment appears to have been the virtual 
freezing of outstanding balances. In the long run the ac-
counts were balanced, but the appearance of temporary defi-
cits and surpluses proved to be unavoidable. In clearing agree-
ments with countries outside COMECON, outstanding debts 
had to be settled after a certain time by surrendering either 
gold or convertible currencies. The only sanction applicable 
to COMECON transactions, however, was payment of an 
annual interest of 2 per cent on the outstanding balance. 
Theoretically, debts were to be paid three months after the 
end of the calendar year; in practice, they were carried over 
to the next year.6s 
Varied attempts have been made to move away from the 
bilateral system. The only well-known example of a quadri-
lateral arrangement failed.69 In a more successful instance, a 
67 Ibid. For another example of the recent change of attitude, the claim 
that bilateral consultations were essential for multilateral specialization, see 
V. Houdek, "Dvoustranna spoluprace," Hospodarske Noviny (Prague), 21 
June 1963. 
68 See A. Zwass, "Trese pieniadza w wymianie zagranicznej panstw socja-
listycznych," Finanse (Warsaw), Vol. XIV (Oct. 1963), pp. 4ff. 
69 The first quadrilateral agreement was signed between the USSR, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Finland in June 1949. Finland was to deliver $100 million 
worth of timber, ships, and prefabricated houses to the USSR. It was to be 
repaid by export of Polish coal ($80 million) and Czech exports of farm 
implements and other goods ($20 million) . The Soviet Union, in turn, was 
to deliver foodstuffs to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Zwass, op. cit., p. 4. 
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country was able to transfer a surplus earned in dealing with 
another country to third countries.70 The first serious effort 
to introduce multilateralism followed an agreement reached 
at the eighth Council session in June 1957 on payment for 
deliveries of goods exceeding the amounts agreed upon bi-
laterally. The old system of bilateral settlements was not 
liquidated and was to serve as the normal form of payment. 
Only surpluses (deficits) arising from annual protocols to 
trade agreements, and other sums agreed upon by all partici-
pating parties, were to be settled multilaterally. A chamber 
within the Soviet State Bank (Gosbank) was to be in charge 
of clearing. Nevertheless, the initial attempt did not prove 
entirely successful, and in the first few years, only 1.5 per 
cent of the total volume of intra-COMECON trade was paid 
for in this fashion.71 
The next step in the direction of a modified multilateral 
system was taken in 1959. Following a conference of COME-
CON financial experts in October of that year, restrictions 
on importation of foreign exchange into the country of origin 
were lifted in December.72 
Finally, an International Bank for Economic Cooperation, 
created by the Executive Committee in October 1963, was 
put in charge of multilateral clearing. According to an official 
statement, all payments-whether under bilateral, multilat-
eral, or other agreements-have to be conducted in trans-
ferable rubles after 1 January 1964. At the end of each cal-
endar year, all outstanding debts and credits have to be 
settled in that currency through the International Bank. 
70 In 1950-51, Romania was running a surplus vis-a-vis Bulgaria. It then 
purchased additional Bulgarian tobacco and re-exported it to Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and East Germany. "Towards a Transferable Rouble?" The Eco-
nomist (London), 19 Oct. 1963, p. 263. 
71 Zwass, op. cit., p. 5 . 
. 72 Knorre, op. cit., p. 42. Apparently Czechoslovakia was from the begin-
mug opposed to any relaxation of nonconvertibility because of the privileged 
position of the Czech crown vis-a-vis currencies of other COMECON mem-
bers. For an official description of the new system, see F. Bystrov, "Organi-
zatsiia mezhdunarodnikh ras'chetov sotsialisticheskikh stran," Voprosy Eko-
nomiki, No. 2 (1960), pp. 112-119. 
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Possibly as a concession to Romania and other members, 
each country receives one vote, and the Bank's recommenda-
tions have to be approved unanimously. Each central bank 
is to have an account in the International Bank from which a 
given country's obligations are to be paid. Individual shares 
of the Bank's capital are determined on the basis of the per-
centage share of exports of a given country in COMECON 
trade. If a country finds itself short of funds, the Bank grants 
it short-term credit which must be repaid within a calendar 
year. Individual commercial transactions among foreign trade 
enterprises of COMECON countries are still being dealt 
with by the respective national central banks. The Interna-
tional Bank simply registers outstanding debts and credits 
and clears them multilaterally. No actual rubles are to be 
transferred. The Bank will not take charge of transactions 
among individual COMECON central banks or of dealings 
between the banks of COMECON and those of the outside 
world.78 
COMECON financial experts attach considerable impor-
tance and hope to the new system. They see it primarily 
as an instrument for the rapid expansion of intra-COME-
CON trade. In addition, the necessity of acquiring transfer-
able rubles is likely to force the various member countries 
to pay greater attention to a satisfactory fulfillment of trad-
ing contracts and to a more careful search for potential export 
outlets. 
Nevertheless, the experts seem to be aware of the fact that 
the success of a multilateral payments scheme is dependent, 
among other things, on the elimination of serious differences 
in the price structure within member states and on the es-
tablishment of a correct system of cross exchange rates. Other-
73 The "one member, one vote" approach has been strongly emphasized 
by Soviet sources, which proudly proclaim that although the Soviet contri-
bution to the Bank's capital amounts to 38 per cent, the USSR has only one 
vote. K. Nazarkin, "A New Form of Cooperation," International Affairs, 
Vol. X (Apr. 1964), p. 61. For further details, see A. Zebrowski, "Miedzynarod-
nowy Bank Wspolpracy Gospodarczej," Finanse, Vol. XV (Feb. 1964); and 
J. Wymikiewicz, "Rozliczenia Miedzy Krajami Socjalistycznymi," ibid. ~Mar. 
1964). 
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wise bilateral agreements will remain as the normal method 
of settling accounts, and the volume of trade still will be de-
termined by the weakest partners, i.e., those who are forced 
to balance their trade at a low level. The experts appear to 
be well acquainted with the experience of the European Pay-
ments Union, which, despite rigorous provisions for settle-
ment of outstanding debts, did not prevent a division of 
membership into perpetual debtors and creditors. In addi-
tion to some unspecified sanctions, some of the experts feel 
that the introduction of restricted convertibility of outstand-
ing balances into gold or free currencies should go a long 
way toward ensuring the success of the new policy.74 
The introduction of multilateral settlement is part of the 
over-all effort to improve the functioning of COMECON 
and to expand its foreign trade. Success depends to a large 
extent, if not wholly, on a number of reforms that have long 
been contemplated by the COMECON countries. As long as 
the prices in individual member states are divorced from 
world prices and from prices in other COMECON countries, 
the new system has little chance of success. There has been 
talk about reforming the price system, but, as indicated 
above, any price reform in planned economies is a long-term 
proposition and for the time being the old structure is likely 
to remain. This fact alone would prevent the new system 
from performing more than a marginal function in intra-
COMECON trade. 
Joint Production 
The possibility of two or more COMECON countries en-
gaging in joint production has been emphasized only re-
cently.75 It is quite probable that one of the reasons for the 
lack of enthusiasm for creating joint enterprises with the 
74 Zwass, op. cit., pp. 9-10. Early in 1964, Poland announced that it would 
propose that the Bank's capital be held in gold or convertible currencies and 
that the transferable rubles be made convertible into gold and free currencies. 
Jaroszewicz, "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid .•. ," op. cit., p. S. 
75 Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Soviet Union is the memory of joint companies organized by 
the USSR after the end of World War II. These companies, 
in the former enemy countries Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ro-
mania, provided an instrument for Soviet exploitation until 
they were dissolved after Stalin's death. Consequently, the 
various joint enterprises formed after 1957 either included 
the Soviet Union as an apparently equal partner or involved 
only the smaller countries. 
Probably the most significant joint production effort was 
the construction of the "Friendship" pipeline linking the 
Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
and Poland. The construction of the first leg, connecting the 
Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, was com-
pleted in 1963 and that of the northern section, linking East 
Germany and Poland, in 1964. 
The importance of this pipeline should not be under-
estimated. The smaller participating countries did not pos-
sess any significant sources of oil, and only Poland had suf-
ficient reserves of hard coal. Despite the fact that the economic 
plans of COMECON countries still consider coal the main 
source of energy up to 1970, the world-wide transfer from coal 
to oil is likely to affect these countries sooner or later. The 
construction of the pipeline should accelerate this process. 
Furthermore, the increase in oil supply to the area should 
facilitate expansion of the chemical industry, which appears 
high on the list of priorities within COMECON. 
Two additional factors give the pipeline importance. In 
view of the rapid expansion of Soviet oil exports to Western 
Europe (particularly to Italy and West Germany), the pipe-
line may further stimulate these exports by bringing oil into 
the center of Europe. Moreover, increasing supplies of oil 
in the area might weaken the position of Romania, the only 
significant COMECON oil producer other than the USSR. 
Undercutting Romania's position at this particular time, 
whether within or outside COMECON, might reduce its 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the rest of the organization. 
Another project which seems mutually advantageous to all 
COMECON members is an integrated power grid that was 
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recommended in May 1959. The power systems of Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR 
were linked during 1960-62. The Bulgarian and Romanian 
networks were to be connected during 1963-64. The entire 
system is to be directed by a Central Control Board in 
Prague which began operations on 1 January 1963.76 Other 
examples of multilateral projects are the Nuclear Research 
Establishment at Dubna (Soviet Union) and the COME-
CON Bureau of Standards in Moscow. 
A somewhat different type of joint enterprise is a common 
freight-car pool to be established during the second half of 
1964. The pool is to have about 100,000 freight cars at its 
disposal. Individual contributions are to be determined by 
the relative shares in COMECON international rail freight 
traffic. Each country will be free to use, within its own ter-
ritory, as many pool cars as it contributes to the pool. Gradu-
ated fees are to be established for cars above the quota. It 
was thought that the pool would contribute toward better 
utilization of cars and reduce unproductive runs, thus miti-
gating the persistent shortage of freight cars in COMECON.77 
Still another example of joint production efforts is bi-
lateral or multilateral cooperation in the production of par-
ticular commodities and in the construction of plants. Ex-
amples of this type of joint enterprise are shown in Table 3. 
It was also decided during 1962 to create producers' associ-
ations-to some extent resembling cartel agreements-for par-
ticular commodities. The first was to affect the output of 
roller bearings and was to include all COMECON members. 
Czechoslovakia and Poland have been considering the forma-
tion of an electronics cartel and, together with East Germany 
and Hungary, they are reviewing the desirability of similar 
agreements for the production of some chemicals.78 
761. Maximov, "The Peace Power Grid," lnternational Affairs, Vol. IX 
(Sept. 1963), pp. 109-IIO. 
77 Olszewski, op. cit., pp. 87-88. 
78 Bodnar, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Table 3 
Economic Cooperation Within COMECON, 1963 
Participating Countries 
I. SovietUnion,EastGermany 
2. Poland, East Germany 
3. Romania, Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia 
4. Soviet Union, Hungary 
.1. Bulgaria, Romania 
fi. Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
7. Poland, Czechoslovakia 
8. Soviet Union, Poland 
9. Czechoslovakia, Poland 
10. Soviet Union, Other 
COMECON members 
Purpose 
Development of chemical 
industry 
Development of brown coal 
industry 
Construction of a cellulose plant 
in Danube delta (to utilize 
rushes) 
Development of aluminum 
industry 
Construction of a hydroelectric 
plant on the Danube 
Construction of a hydroelectric 
plant on the Danube 
Joint production of heavy 
trucks 
Expansion of potash fertilizer 
industry 
Development of copper, sul-
phur, and coal mining 
Development of phosphorous 
fertilizer industry 
SouRCE: Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 28 July 196!1, cited in Ostprobl,me 
(Bonn), Vol. XV, No. 21 (18 Oct. 196!1) , p. ~-
In view of the difficulties encountered in coordination of 
plans, specialization, and intra-COMECON trade, joint pro-
duction, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis, appears 
to be the best solution for COMECON. Joint enterprises 
manage to avoid many of the pitfalls associated with multi-
lateralism, yet at the same time they do bring about a better 
allocation of resources and reduction in costs, if only on a 
limited scale. From the political point of view, these enter-
prises seem much more acceptable to the membership. This 
apparently has now been recognized by the top COMECON 
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authorities, and this type of cooperation will probably show 
a significant increase, especially since isolated examples of 
bilateral cooperation have proved quite satisfactory. 
Other Activities 
In contrast to the considerable, if not always successful, ac-
tivity in the coordination of plans or in the creation of a 
multilateral payments system, other less dramatic but equal-
ly important areas were generally left untouched. 
One of these areas was the establishment of industrial stand-
ards and norms. Even within individual COMECON coun-
tries the standardization process was slow, and no country, 
including the USSR, managed to agree on more than a few 
hundred standards.79 It was not until June 1962 that a deci-
sion was taken to create a Standing Standardization Commis-
sion and to establish a COMECON Bureau of Standards. 
Impetus in the direction of another important albeit neg-
lected field, that of technological and economic research, was 
provided by the June 1962 conference of Party leaders of 
COMECON countries. An attempt to coordinate research 
had already been made in 1961, particularly after a confer-
ence of the chairmen of national academies of sCiences had 
called for the creation of a number of joint research institutes 
patterned after the Nuclear Research Establishment at 
Dubna. Apparently this did not produce any significant re-
sults, since the June 1962 conference created a Standing Com-
mission for the Coordination of Scientific Research to serve 
as the supreme coordinating organ in such fields as research, 
technological progress, and the training of skilled cadres. 80 
One major conclusion emerges from a review of economic 
policies undertaken by COMECON. If the aim of the vari-
ous measures has been to attain a fairly high degree of 
79 Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 101. 
so Bodnar, op. cit., p. 16. 
economic integration in East Central Europe, this task has 
not been accomplished. But it is clear that some successes 
have been achieved. Coordination of economic plans is taking 
place, although on a bilateral basis. In a number of industries 
specialization is now accepted by COMECON members even 
though it seldom takes place among more than two or three 
countries. Restricted convertibility has been introduced, 
joint investment projects have been undertaken, and research 
is being conducted on a multilateral basis by the COMECON 
countries. 
But the major objective, the establishment of a suprana-
tional authority able to institute coordination and specializa-
tion on an organization-wide basis, has not been achieved. 
Some of the reasons for this failure have been mentioned 
above. Some were purely economic in nature: absence of a 
rational price system, traditional distrust of intra-COME-
CON trade as a means of plan fulfillment, and lack of other 
economic instruments necessary for proper economic ac-
counting. The major reason for the presumably temporary 
abandonment of plans for a supranational body seems to have 
been the opposition of some COMECON members to the 
ideas emanating from Moscow. The creation of a suprana-
tional authority would have meant surrender of a certain 
degree of sovereignty, and none of the member states were 
particularly eager to have this happen. When it became clear 
that the new body was to be empowered to enforce coordi-
nation of plans and also to put far-reaching specialization into 
practice, the opposition came to the surface and apparently 
was strong enough to cause the project's abandonment. It was 
the old story of "have not" countries refusing to cooperate 
and provide the "haves" with raw materials and foodstuffs. 
For the time being they appear to have won the battle, but 
the future is not at all clear. 
45 
National Attitudes 
There is little doubt that the USSR was actually the initi-
ator of closer economic integration in the socialist camp. Its 
almost purely political motivation, the substitution of eco· 
nomic for political ties linking the Soviet Union with other 
communist countries, was discussed earlier in this essay. From 
the economic point of view, it is not at all certain whether 
East Central Europe today represents an asset or a burden 
for the USSR, but the idea of replacing one set of ties with 
another must have looked very tempting, and the Soviet 
leadership became committed to it. Nevertheless, it is char-
acteristic of the new situation within COMECON that at the 
first sign of opposition to closer integration, the Soviet Union 
abandoned its efforts and, seeking to faire bonne mine a 
mauvais jeu, was apparently willing to withdraw from its 
previous position. The attitude of the Soviet Union toward 
the most recent policies of COMECON deserves a study of 
its own. This chapter will be limited to an analytical review 
of the attitudes and reactions of other communist countries 
both inside and outside COMECON to the organizations 
efforts to achieve closer economic integration. 
China 
The People's Republic of China has never officially joined 
COMECON, but it has participated in meetings of the COME-
CON Council and of other agencies by sending observers, be-
ginning with the seventh session in May 1956. 
China's reasons for remaining outside the organization are 
obscure. According to some writers, the slow growth of 
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COMECON, China's preoccupation with its own economic 
and social problems, and the growth of trade between the 
USSR and China did not make participation urgent or even 
necessary before 1957.81 
It can be presumed, however, that the Chinese found 
nothing objectionable about COMECON until 1956. In 
September of that year, the Eighth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party endorsed the newly announced policy of 
specialization within COMECON. The Soviet Union also 
appeared to favor closer ties between China and the rest of 
the members, and various statements to that effect were made 
during 1958. But the official communique issued at the close 
of the eleventh COMECON Council session in May 1959 
implied that no changes in membership provisions were 
contemplated at that time. 82 
It is not clear what the role of COMECON was in the con-
flict that developed between the USSR and China. No refer-
ence to the organization can be found in the official Chinese 
account of the rift.83 There is evidence that China did object, 
on roughly the same grounds as Romania, to the Soviet at-
tempt at the June 1962 conference of Party leaders of COME-
CON countries to create a supranational coordinating au-
thority. A letter sent on 14 June 1963 by the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China to the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party stated: 
Every socialist country must rely mainly on itself for its construc-
tion. In accordance with its own concrete conditions, every so-
cialist country must rely first of all on the diligent labour and 
81 0. Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations in Recent Years," in K. 
London, ed., Unity and Contradiction (New York: Praeger, 1962) , ].>· 296. 
According to Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 4, "the difference in time in takmg the 
road to socialism prevented [other socialist countries] from simultaneously 
entering into joint economic cooperation." The absence of Asian countries 
was also explained by the fact that if COMECON was to be treated as an 
answer to OEEC, it should be restricted to European countries. Knorre, op. 
cit., p. 4. 
82 Hoeffdin~, op. cit., pp. 297·298. 
88 "The Ongin and Development of the Differences Between the Leader-
ship of CPSU and Ourselves," Peking Review (Peking) , No. 37 (13 Sept. 
1963) • pp. 6-20. 
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talents of its own people, utilize all its available resources fully and 
in a planned way and bring all its potential into play in socialist 
construction .... If, proceeding only from its own partial interests, 
any socialist country unilaterally demands that other fraternal 
countries submit to its needs, and uses the pretext of opposing 
what they call "going it alone" and "nationalism," ... then these 
are pure manifestations of national egoism.s4 
The implications of this passage are fairly clear. At its 
present stage of development, China needs capital equipment 
above all. Until the early 1960s it was able to acquire such 
equipment from the COMECON countries-primarily from 
the USSR. The Soviet Union granted China considerable 
credits and also sent experts and technicians to provide tech-
nical advice. All this has now changed. Not only has the 
Soviet Union recalled its technicians, but the volume of trade 
between COMECON and China has dropped to just a 
fraction of its total in the late 1950s. There is little doubt 
that this reduction has hurt China and has seriously affected 
its rate of industrialization.85 This also explains the Chinese 
emphasis on the necessity of mutual aid and cooperation 
among socialist countries. 
In the statement cited above, the Chinese Communist 
Party went on record as opposed to the new COMECON 
policy of stressing specialization: 
It is absolutely necessary for socialist countries to practise mutual 
economic assistance and cooperation and exchange. Such economic 
cooperation must be based on the principles of complete equality, 
mutual benefit and comradely mutual assistance. It would be great 
power chauvinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name 
of "international division of labor" or "specialization" to impose 
one's will on others .... 86 
It can be assumed that China's attitude stems from its aware-
ness that, together with certain COMECON countries, it 
84 "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Com-
munist Movement," Peking Review, No. 30 (26 July 1963), p. 22. 
85 Simultaneously, some COMECON countries, for example Czechoslovakia, 
were seriously hurt by the cutback_ 
86 "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Com-
munist Movement," op. cit_, p. 22. 
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would become a more or less permanent supplier of raw 
materials to the more advanced member countries. It is not 
surprising that the Chinese opposed the new policies an-
nounced in 1962.87 Judging by its pronouncements concern-
ing other aspects of intra-COMECON relations, China was 
aspiring if not for leadership, at least for equality with the 
USSR. If this was the case, it could not tolerate being rel-
egated even temporarily to the ranks of countries producing 
raw materials. It appears to have found at least one European 
ally, Romania, voicing similar sentiments. 
The Case of Romania 
The first indication of Romania's dissatisfaction with 
COMECON was greeted with incredulity in both East and 
West. By all objective standards, Romania was the one coun-
try in the bloc least likely to harbor opposition to Soviet 
leadership and to the USSR's attempt to strengthen COME-
CON. 
There was no indication that the leadership of the Ro-
manian Communist Party would ever oppose Moscow's di-
rectives. The majority of members of the Party's Presidium 
could trace their antecedents to the Stalinist era and had 
managed to resist the tide of de-Stalinization that engulfed 
East Central Europe after 1956. With the possible exceptions 
of the Czechoslovak and East German Communist Parties, 
the Romanian Party had the reputation of being the most 
docile and obedient in the bloc. Until 1963, it showed no 
signs of independence or anti-Soviet feeling. 
However, external appearances can be deceptive. To some 
extent the situation in Romania today resembles that of 
87 Even though China stopped attending COMECON Council sessions 
in late 1961, it is still, together with North Korea and North Vietnam, "tak-
ing part in the work of Council organs in connection with matters of interest 
to [it]." United Nations Doc. E/CONF.46/17, 8 Jan. 1964, p. 5. One 
of the matters of interest is nuclear research, and Chinese scientists were re-
ported to be working at the COMECON Nuclear Research Establishment at 
Dubna in January 1964. Pro:vda, 22 Jan. 1964. 
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Yugoslavia in 1948. Tito, by imitating Stalin, was able to 
obtain absolute control over the Yugoslav Communist Party 
and thus to preclude a Soviet attempt to split the Party and 
create an anti-Tito opposition. In Romania, Party leader 
Gheorghiu-Dej managed to secure absolute obedience in 
much the same way. Thus the conflict between Romania and 
COMECON, like the Tito-Stalin conflict, appears to contain 
some strong nationalist and anti-Soviet undertones. In both 
instances, Party leaders seem to have been successful in mobil-
izing even the non-Party elements in their respective countries 
under the banner of national sovereignty and independence. 
Furthermore, at the time of their respective challenges to 
Soviet leadership, Romania and Yugoslavia were rather 
heavily dependent on economic ties with the Soviet Union 
and the other members of the organization. 
Here, however, the analogy ends. Yugoslavia enjoyed some 
advantage over Romania by not having a common frontier 
with the USSR. But Romania appears to be in a much better 
position on several counts. First of all, the Soviet Union of 
I 964 is a far cry from Stalinist Russia insofar as the relation-
ship with East Central European countries is concerned. 
Romania is also in better shape economically than Yugo-
slavia was in 1948, both in its level of development and in its 
endowment with natural resources, especially oil. It appar-
ently has not so far encountered any serious agricultural 
problems. Although it is dependent on the COMECON 
countries for a number of key commodities, Romania is in a 
better position to seek alternative sources of supply and, more 
important, to pay. The attitude of the West, particularly of 
the United States, toward any sign of an independent policy 
emanating from East Central Europe (e.g., Poland since 
1956, made the Romanian position still easier. 
These advantages would not have counted for much had 
the Soviet Union not been engaged in the struggle for leader-
ship in the communist world and unwilling or unable, for a 
variety of reasons, to bring Romania into line. The example 
of Albania, which has successfully managed to defy Soviet 
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leadership since 1961, must have been quite instructive for 
the Romanians. 
Apparently Romania's decision to oppose the plan to es-
tablish a supranational authority in COMECON was taken 
at the March 1963 meeting of the Central Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party. The resolution, published after 
the plenum, stated that Romania intended to continue on 
its present course of industrialization, emphasizing heavy 
industry as well as other branches of industry. Following the 
meeting, there were further signs in Romania of growing 
dissatisfaction with COMECON policies and of attempts to 
steer a more independent course.88 It appears that the Soviet 
Union tried to persuade Romania either to accept the recom-
mendations of COMECON, or at least not to advertise the 
growing split within the organization.89 The Soviet pleas 
seem to have fallen on deaf ears and even to have added fuel 
to the explosive situation.90 
A delegation of the Romanian Communist Party visited 
Peking in February 1964 in an attempt to mediate between 
China and the USSR. In April 1964, the Central Committee 
of the Party again published a resolution spelling out its 
opposition to the proposed establishment of a COMECON 
coordinating authority.91 In May, talks between Romania 
88 The story of Romania's defiance of COMECON has been detailed else-
where. See J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," Survey, No. 49 (Oct. 
1963), pp. 19-34; J. B. Thompson, "Rumania's Struggle With Comecon," 
East Europe, Vol. XIII (June 1964) , pp. 2-9; R. L. Braham, "Rumania: Onto 
the Separate Path," Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (May-June 
1964), pp. 14-24. More recent developments are outlined in the New York 
Times, 6 July 1964. 
89 According to newspaper reports, during June and July 1963, Romania 
was visited by a number of high Soviet dignitaries, including Khrushchev, 
presumably for the purpose of bringing it back into the fold. New York 
Times, 6 June, 2 and 4 July 1963. 
90 Romania was the only country to send her ambassador back to Albania. 
Furthermore, it signed a trade agreement with China calling for a 10 per 
cent expansion of trade. Communist Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej was con-
spicuously absent from a gathering of COMECON leaders assembled in East 
Berlin to celebrate Ulbricht's seventieth birthday. New York Times, 30 May 
and 2 July 1963. 
91 For excerpts of the resolution, see East Europe, Vol. XIII Gune 1964), 
pp. 25-30. 
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and the United States took place in Washington and, simul-
taneously, a visit to France was announced. 
What makes the Romanian case especially interesting is 
the fact that the Aprill964 resolution opposing the strength-
ening of COMECON came at a time when it was fairly well 
known that the attempt had been abandoned several months 
before, in July 1963. Whether the resolution was simply the 
reflection of an aroused nationalism, or a bow in the direction 
of either China or the United States, or both, it did not make 
much sense. Possibly Romania overreached itself. This was 
evidently in Tito's mind when he met the Romanian Party 
leaders and warned them against going too far in their op-
position to the Soviet Union.92 There is no doubt, however, 
that Romanian opposition to recent COMECON policies 
contributed significantly to their withdrawal. Whether this 
victory is temporary or permanent remains to be seen. 
Other COMECON Members 
All available evidence suggests that the other COMECON 
states-Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
and Poland-are taking new policies in their stride, despite 
occasional opposition. The "supporters" of COMECON do 
not represent a homogeneous group. Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany can be described as economically advanced; Bul-
garia can still be classified as an underdeveloped country; and 
Poland and Hungary rank somewhere in between. 
The reaction of individual countries to policies such as in-
creased specialization and coordination or to the introduction 
of multilateralism is governed by the level of their economic 
development. Thus Czechoslovakia and East Germany fully 
supported the concept of a "socialist international division of 
labor," which obviously guaranteed them preferential treat-
ment.93 At the same time, however, Czechoslovakia voiced 
92New York Times, 26 June 1964. 
93 For an account of the Czechoslovak attitude, see Montias, "Uniformity 
and Diversity in the East European Future ... ," op. cit., pp. 10-15. 
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serious misgivings about the introduction of convertibility, 
while East Germany attempted to move even faster than the 
USSR in some respects.94 
Poland and Hungary have supported nearly every measure 
undertaken by COMECON. It was Premier Gomulka of 
Poland who complained about the slow progress of economic 
cooperation within COMECON. Poland was also responsible 
for the convening of the June 1962 conference of Party lead-
ers from COMECON countries, which resulted in the call for 
greater coordination and specialization.95 
The generally positive attitudes of these two countries 
toward the COMECON "new look" may be ascribed to a 
number of factors. Probably the most important of these is 
that both countries stood a good chance to gain from the new 
blueprint for intra-COMECON specialization. The output 
of some industries might have been reduced or eliminated 
entirely, representing a serious loss in terms of past invest-
ment. But both countries seem to have been sophisticated 
enough to realize that continued production of commodities 
which could be obtained more cheaply from other COME-
CON countries was as a rule unprofitable. Unlike Bulgaria 
or Romania, Hungary and Poland had laid a fairly substantial 
foundation for sustained economic growth and were not as 
emotionally committed to the establishment of heavy industry. 
A second factor is that both countries, Hungary particu-
larly, are rather poorly endowed with natural resources, and 
both preferred to develop and emphasize the role of purveyor 
94 At the fourteenth COMECON Council session in East Berlin (Feb.-
Mar. 1961) Ulbricht appeared in the role of a preceptor, criticizing other 
members and putting East Germany forward as the shining example of a 
country fully committed to COMECON. He was also first to mention the 
problem of standardizing industrial products. He had been trying to force 
East German industry to abandon prewar German norms and to accept Soviet 
standards, thus breaking another of the ties linking East and West Germany. 
Apparently he was rebuffed by representatives of the USSR, who were not 
eager to arrange the changeover at that particular time. Neue Zurcher Zei-
tung (Zurich), 6 Mar. 1961. 
95 According to some sources, Poland and Czechoslovakia actually resisted 
tighter integration at the June 1962 conference. Poland was responsible for 
the eventual adoption of a Soviet proposal to establish an Executive Com-
mittee without visible executive powers. New York Times, 17 June 1962. 
53 
of industrial products in exchange for raw materials and 
possibly food. Thus the very heavy expenditures usually as-
sociated with the discovery and development of domestic 
sources of raw materials could have been avoided, releasing 
funds for other purposes. The division of COMECON into 
countries specializing in the extraction of raw materials and 
those concentrating on manufacturing and processing was 
found to please Hungary and Poland almost as much as 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany.96 
A third factor that might have influenced the attitude of 
both countries is that a fairly high share of their trade is 
conducted with the "capitalist" world in general and with 
Common Market countries in particular. The eventual es-
tablishment of a common tariff by the EEC would hit Hun-
gary and Poland hard, preventing them from selling their tra-
ditional exports, food and semi-manufactures, in return for 
industrial equipment. This would lead Hungary and Poland 
to turn to other COMECON countries as potential sup-
pliers of badly needed machinery. 
Political factors will undoubtedly play a role in the atti-
tudes of individual COMECON members. East Germany is 
not likely to assert any degree of independence, in view of 
its special position in the bloc and its nearly total dependence 
on the Soviet Union for survival. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia 
were, until recently, also ruled by individuals totally com-
mitted to the support of Soviet policies. On the surface, the 
situation in Hungary and Poland might appear quite dif-
ferent, since the Party leadership in both countries came to 
power in 1956 as a result of serious upheavals. Nevertheless, 
96 At the meeting of Party leaders of COMECON countries in Moscow in 
May 1958, Czechoslovakia and East Germany attempted to force Poland to 
specialize only in coal and steel, leaving machinery production to them. 
Possibly this was in revenge for the cutback in export of Polish coal to both 
countries in 1956-57. The USSR reportedly took Poland's side. New York 
Times, 25 May 1958. It was also reported that the USSR and Poland felt that, 
in view of its high level of development, Czechoslovakia was not doing enough 
to foster COMECON integration. East Germany was advised to abandon air-
craft production and expansion of the Baltic port of Rostock, while the 
capacity of Polish ports remained under-utilized. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 25 
May 1958. 
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the cautious attitude of the USSR toward both countries in 
the last eight years and its willingness to allow them consider-
able latitude in various facets of political, social, and eco-
nomic life, has apparently paid off handsomely. Premiers 
Kadar and Gomulka can be counted among Khrushchev's 
staunchest supporters. 
In the summer of 1964 there was little indication that the 
example of Romania might be followed by any of the other 
COMECON members. It should be kept in mind, however, 
that only a year or two ago Romania's defection was totally 
unexpected. 97 
Yugoslavia 
In January 1949, Yugoslavia was interested in COMECON 
membership and expressed its willingness to join if the Com-
inform resolution of June 1948 were rescinded.98 There is 
little doubt that Yugoslavia was very eager to maintain close 
economic ties with COMECON countries in view of its hos-
tile policy toward the West and its dependence on imports 
from COMECON to fulfill its ambitious five-year plan. How-
ever, Yugoslavia was not at that time invited to join COME-
CON, and in the course of the next seven years, its commer-
cial relations with the organization were reduced to a mini-
mum. After the Khrushchev-Tho reconciliation in 1955, 
Yugoslavia was invited to participate as an observer in 
COMECON Council sessions and did so in 1956 and 1957. 
It ceased to participate in COMECON activities when the 
second Soviet-Yugoslav controversy began in 1958.99 
During the past year, however, there were reports that 
97 It is not entirely inconceivable that the next two opponents of COME-
CON integration might be Poland and Hungary. In May 1963, some two 
months after the first indication of Romania's opposition, Kadar and Gomulka 
met to discuss COMECON affairs. New York Times, 21 May 1963. Judging 
by statements appearing in the Polish press, there is relatively little en-
thusiasm for closer coordination, and official statistics indicate that Hun-
garian trade with the West has been growing steadily since 1958. 
98 Statement by Foreign Minister Kardelj on 2 February 1949. New York 
Times, 3 Feb. 1949. 
99 During 1959 and 1960 Yugoslavia tried to regain its previous status 
without success. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit., p. 208. 
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Yugoslavia might once again obtain COMECON observer 
status.100 The USSR seemed to be eager to establish the 
closest possible links, and Yugoslavia warmly endorsed the 
idea. With the EEC approaching the final stages of economic 
integration in the West and COMECON showing signs of 
progress in the East, Yugoslavia was becoming economically 
isolated. While it might have preferred to establish closer 
ties with the EEC after the pattern set by Greece and Iran, 
this was not a real possibility. Rejoining COMECON even 
on a limited basis thus appeared preferable to isolation. In 
addition, growing political rapprochement between the 
USSR and Yugoslavia has recently attained great intensity.101 
In view of this, Yugoslavia may become a full member of 
COMECON, particularly if, after Tito's death or retirement, 
the Soviet rather than the Western faction within the Yugo-
slav Communist Party leadership comes to power. 
Attitude& Toward the EEC 
As the European Economic Community gained increasing 
vitality, COMECON's tactics consisted mainly of virulent 
attacks on the Common Market combined occasionally with 
grudging admiration of its successes.102 COMECON objec-
tions to the EEC are based on both political and economic 
grounds. From the political point of view, it can be assumed 
that the Soviet Union, in particular, does not care to see a 
strong and prosperous Western Europe, primarily because 
it could become a much more formidable opponent either 
singly or in alliance with the United States. Even though 
Stalin was and still is occasionally called the "unifier of 
100 New York Times, 28 Aug. and 4 Sept. 1963. According to later reports, 
Yugoslavia was to receive permission in the second half of 1964 to attend the 
meetings of five COMECON Standing Commissions. New York Times, 2 July 
1964. 
101 In June 1964, Tito appeared in the role of a quasi-postillon d'amour 
when he attempted to mediate between the USSR and Romania. His talks 
with Khrushchev during the same month and his state visit to Poland are 
indicative of the progressive rapprochement. 
102 For an example of this attitude, see Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 6-8. 
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Europe," the fact remains that until the late 1950s one could 
hardly speak of a united Western Europe. After this period, 
however, considerable progress was made in the direction of 
unity, and Soviet apprehensions began to grow.103 
Another COMECON objection to the Common Market 
is the realization that a prosperous Western Europe might 
serve as a magnet for the uncommitted and underdeveloped 
countries of Asia and Africa. It is not inconceivable that the 
recent increase in COMECON aid to underdeveloped coun-
tries is an attempt to neutralize that influence. The latest 
Soviet loans to Algeria and Egypt, announced in 1964, point 
in that direction. 
Some COMECON members also feel apprehensive about 
the future of their trade with the Common Market. Actually, 
it is still too early to say anything precise about what the 
effects of the Common Market on COMECON trade will be 
by 1970, when all tariff barriers within the EEC will have 
been removed. Fairly high tariffs as well as quantitative re-
strictions may be established for some agricultural commodi-
ties.104 Hungary, Poland, and Romania-all exporters of con-
siderable quantities of food to some of the EEC countries, 
notably West Germany-would be the COMECON members 
most severely affected. One might even speculate that, since 
France appears to be able to supply most of the food needed 
by the EEC countries, imports of foodstuffs from COME-
CON by these countries might be reduced to almost nothing. 
The USSR, on the other hand, stands less chance of being 
hurt, since its exports to the EEC countries consist primarily 
of raw materials, on which the duty will not be very high. 
Those COMECON members who are not Contracting 
103 EFT A was not as strongly attacked as the EEC. Apparently EFT A was 
considered a potential source of European neutralism; it contributed to a 
split in Europe, and its chances of developing into a stronger association 
were recognized as rather poor. H. Mendershausen, The European Commun-
ity and the Bloc (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., Nov. 1962), p. 9. 
104 There is no doubt that COMECON statements welcoming the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and calling for universal 
abolition of restrictions on trade reflected an effort to affect the quota re-
strictions contemplated by tlle Common Market. 
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Parties to GATT and are not participating in the present 
Kennedy Round negotiations at Geneva will find themselves 
in a particularly difficult situation with respect to the EEC 
by 1970.105 It is therefore not surprising that COMECON 
countries have called unconditional most-favored-nation 
treatment "a basic element in international trade relations" 
and have complained that Common Market and EFT A mem-
bers have refused to extend most-favored-nation treatment to 
individual COMECON members who had been guaranteed 
such treatment under bilateral agreements.106 In answer, the 
EEC and EFT A have asserted that international law, multi-
lateral conventional law (e.g., GATT) , and bilateral treaties 
do not obligate customs unions to extend concessions under 
this rule. Hence, according to Common Market sources, 
future imports from COMECON and other state-trading 
countries "would be governed by the special features of this 
trade and not by the intention of applying to these countries 
a treatment less favorable than that applied to other coun-
tries."107 The USSR and other COMECON countries refuse 
to recognize the Common Market as a customs union or the 
Common Market Commission as the bargaining agent for 
EEC countries. The Commission's offer to grant tariff con-
cessions to the Soviet Union is contingent upon recognition 
and remains unanswered.108 
105 Nonmembers of the EEC ,who belong to GATT will gain access to th~ 
Common Market through the Kennedy Round. Czechoslovakia is a full mem· 
ber of GATT, and Poland achieved associate membership in 1960. They do 
not, however, enjoy all GATT's benefits (e.g., the most-favored-nation clause) 
since, as state-trading countries, they are unable to fulfill their obligations 
under the provisions of GATT. According to recent reports, Romania has ex-
pressed interest in joining GATT. New York Times, 9 June 1964. Poland 
applied for permission to participate in the Kennedy Round talks. Its ap-
plication was supported by the United States and opposed by Britain, which 
finds it more profitable to continue the present system of bilateral trading 
with Poland. New York Times, 6 May 1964. 
106 United Nations Doc. E/CONF.46/PC/47, Annex A, 18 Dec. 1963, pp. 7·8. 
101 Ibid., p. 10. 
108 In September 196!1, the EEC Council of Ministers decided to grant 
tariff concessions to the USSR in return for the recognition of EEC as a 
trading unit. The concessions were to affect the duty on vodka (reducing 
it to the same level as whiskey), caviar, and crab meat. European Commun-
itv. No. 66 (1963), p. 2, and New York Times, 27 Sept. 1963. There are in-
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There is not, at this writing, a definite Common Market 
policy toward COMECON, but time is running short.109 
Some trade agreements have been signed between various 
COMECON members and the EEC countries, particularly 
West Germany. After 1970, however, the EEC will probably 
have a common trade policy, and bilateral trade agreements 
will come to an end. The Common Market Commission re-
cently recommended that by 31 December 1964, the six 
member states of the EEC should insist on inserting a safe-
guard clause in their bilateral agreements with state-trading 
countries. Such a clause would permit Common Market 
members to take appropriate measures against any disrup-
tions in their economies caused by imports from COME-
CON.110 
Once the EEC establishes a common trade policy, its 
Commission will become the exclusive bargaining agent of 
member countries vis-a-vis COMECON. Consequently, the 
USSR and other COMECON states would be unable to play 
off the EEC countries against each other in order to obtain 
preferential treatment.lll 
There are, however, some advantages accruing to COME-
CON from the establishment of the EEC. For example, the 
emergence of a common tariff might force many countries 
that have thus far exported primarily to Western Europe 
to look for other markets. This is particularly true of the less 
developed countries, which might turn to COMECON. Some 
dications that the Soviet Union is contemplating recognition of EEC. New 
York Times, 6 May 1964. A statement issued in Brussels in March 1963 by 
the Communist Parties of the six EEC countries and of Britain also favored 
establishment of commercial relations between EEC and COMECON, with 
the EEC as an agent for the six Western European countries. Council of 
Europe, Consultative Assembly, Report on Commercial Relations Between 
Member States of the Council of Europe and the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Document 1676, 30 Sept. 1963, p. 12. 
109 EEC Doc. 1/COM (64) /53, 26 Feb. 1964. 
110 "The European Community and the Bloc," Address by F. T. Van Dyk, 
Deputy Director, European Community Information Service in Washington, 
to the American Management Association meeting, 22 May 1964. Members 
of the EEC are not particularly enthusiastic about the clause because they 
are afraid that it may require them to grant concessions. 
111 Mendershausen, op. cit., p. 12. The USSR and Hungary introduced 
new tariffs during 1961 as a bargaining tool vis·a·vis the Common Market. 
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authorities feel, however, that the extent of this trade diver-
sion would not be significant.112 
In many respects, COMECON's position with regard to 
the Common Market may be more favorable than that of 
many other countries. It is clear that a decline in trade would 
create difficulties on both the import and export sides. Never-
theless, because of the nature of their economic organization, 
COMECON countries are relatively better equipped to deal 
with problems caused by the emergence of the Common 
Market. They are able to exercise full control over their 
foreign trade and to absorb losses occasioned by the higher 
common tariff imposed by the EEC. 
It is not at all clear to what extent the success of the 
Common Market contributed to the recent attempts to 
strengthen economic integration within COMECON. Some 
Western observers have not hesitated to claim that "integra-
tion in Western Europe is producing integration by induc-
tion in Eastern Europe.''113 Although the success of the EEC 
may have been instrumental in this respect, many other fac-
tors were involved which contributed as much, if not more, 
toward closer integration of COMECON economies. It can 
be argued that even if the Common Market had failed, closer 
integration of COMECON economies would still have come 
about sooner or later. 
The fallacy of comparing COMECON and the Common 
Market also deserves mention. As one authority on the sub-
ject puts it, at least three considerations make a comparison 
rather strained. The first is that the relationship between the 
USSR and the rest of COMECON does not have a counter-
part in Western Europe. Second, attempts at economic in-
tegration started much earlier in "\\!estern Europe than in 
East Central Europe. Finally, it is more difficult to integrate 
countries with planned economies than those with free 
markets.114 
112 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
113 Shulman, op. cit., p. 660. 
114 Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist 
Bloc: A Survey," op. cit., p. 182. 
60 
Conclusions 
By all objective standards it can be argued that the process 
of economic integration in East Central Europe in which 
COMECON is intended to play a crucial role has been rather 
slow. Some of the reasons for this have been discussed, and 
a number of studies have treated this subject in more detail.115 
Among the obstacles encountered by COMECON, the 
chief one today appears to be the desire of many members 
to protect their national sovereignty and interests. The ex-
amples of Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia in the past, and 
of Albania, China, and Romania more recently, indicate that 
nationalism is by no means dead and may actually be more 
vital than ever. The orientation of these countries stems 
primarily from the fact that, in the past, the Soviet Union, 
by virtue of its overwhelming superiority, was able to impose 
its will upon others in every sphere of political, economic, 
and social life. Even if the present relationship between Mos-
cow and other members of COMECON differs greatly from 
the Stalinist period, old memories linger and make any at-
tempt, however rational, to achieve greater integration under 
Soviet leadership a rather touchy subject. Consequently, 
115 See E. Neuberger, "Soviet Economic Integration: Some Suggested Ex-
planations for Slow Progress," op. cit., and "International Division of Labor 
in CEMA: Limited Regret Strategy," op. cit. For an earlier attempt, see A. 
Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," Problems of 
Communism, Vol. VIII, No. 4 Ouly-Aug. 1959), pp. 23-29. One of tbe most 
interesting discussions of the economic integration of East Central Europe 
can be found in R. Krengel, "Die wirtschaftlichen ,Jntegrationsbestrebungen 
und Integrationshindernisse im Ostblock," in E. Boettcher, ed., Ostblock, EWG 
und Entwicklungsliinder (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963), pp. 51-
79. For a study of purely economic obstacles to closer integration, see R. 
Bird, "Problems of Harmonization in Soviet-type Economies: The Case of 
COMECON," Columbia University Dept. of Economics, Feb. 1964. Mimeo-
graphed. 
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measures that are perfectly logical and legitimate from the 
economic point of view (for example, international speciali-
zation or multilateral trade) are greeted with suspicion and 
in some instances openly resisted. 
Other factors making progress toward integration more 
difficult are the attachment to autarky and the resultant dis-
trust of foreign trade, which are inherent in the nature of 
planned economies. The ideological commitment to the de-
velopment of heavy industry at any cost makes specialization 
rather meaningless. The absence of a system of economic 
accounting based on rational cost and price data makes pro-
gress toward better utilization of resources almost impossible. 
No rapid advance in economic integration within COME-
CON can therefore be expected in the immediate future. 
This does not mean that the present arrangement is here to 
stay. It simply means that further integration will probably 
be painfully slow and cumbersome. Sovereignty will be pro-
tected by voluntary bilateral agreements. The commitment 
to autarky and heavy industry, as well as distrust of foreign 
trade, may gradually undergo alteration as a result of the 
revisions taking place almost daily within the ideological 
framework. Even a comprehensive, across-the-board price re-
form may eventually be carried out within COMECON. 
These changes would give the organization a first chance to 
show its potential. 
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